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The United States is reeling from the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression.' This financial crisis, like many depressions and
recessions, emanated from the bursting of an investment bubble.2
Against this backdrop, calls have come from diverse quarters to reassess
how our financial system operates in order to prevent the next bubble.
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, in his influential book about the
crisis called A Failure of Capitalism, predicted: "Capitalism will survive the
current depression as it did the Great Depression of the 1930s.... Yet
capitalism may survive only in a compromised form ... ,3 Nobel Prize-
winning economist Paul Krugman issued the following challenge:
We will not achieve the understanding we need,
however, unless we are willing to think clearly about our
problems and to follow those thoughts wherever they lead.
Some people say that our economic problems are structural,
with no quick cure available; but I believe that the only
important structural obstacles to world prosperity are the
obsolete doctrines that clutter the minds of men.
Indeed, then-president of the American Association of Law Schools Rachel
Moran directed this charge directly to the legal profession.
'See Credit Crisis-The Essentials, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/c/creditcrisis/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier (last updated Jan 10, 2011)
("In the fall of 2008, a credit squeeze ballooned into Wall Street's biggest crisis since the Great
Depression."); Timothy Geithner, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opening Statement Before
the U.S. Senate Banking Committee Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing (June 18, 2009),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg176.aspx ("Over the past
two years, our nation has faced the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression.").
2 RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 13 (2009) ("The current economic
emergency is similarly the outgrowth of the bursting of an investment bubble. The bubble started
in housing but eventually engulfed the financial industry."); see Seth A. Klarman, Preface to the
Sixth Edition of BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS, at xiii, xxi (6th ed.
2009) ("Capital market manias regularly occur on a grand scale: Japanese stocks in the late
1980s, Internet and technology stocks in 1999 and 2000, subprime mortgage lending in 2006 and
2007, and alternative investments currently.").
3 POSNER, supra note 2, at 234.
4PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at
191 (2009).
5
Rachel F. Moran, Presidential Address at 2009 House of Representatives Annual Meeting:
Transformative Law (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.aals.org/servicesnewsletter
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In the ensuing fallout from the current financial crisis, a common refrain
is that certain securities, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), were
fraudulently overpriced. For example, a website created by several
affiliated law firms purporting to represent "investors who lost money in the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market and related structured
investments" poses the question: "Have UBS's clients and investors been
overcharged for subprime securities they purchased?",6 MBS investors have
filed myriad lawsuits against issuers, alleging that their investments have
plummeted in value from their inflated offering price.7 Indeed, several
commentators have questioned whether this alleged overpricing of
securities could, in and of itself, form the basis of a fraud claim. 8
This article, responding to the calls for innovative thinking about how to
prevent the next financial crisis, explores the novel theory of price fraud. In
particular, this paper analyzes whether alleged overpricing of securities by
issuers and underwriters falls within the scope of securities fraud under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 In addition, this
paper studies the implications of treating this conduct as securities fraud,
including whether this innovative application of Section 10(b) to
overpricing could help prevent the next financial crisis.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II argues that, during a market
bubble, some issuers and underwriters knowingly sell overpriced securities,
which-in turn--contributes to the expansion of the bubble. Part III
presMarch09.php ("At times, the legal profession has been complicit in its own
marginalization .... ).
6
See UBS Overview, SUBPRIME AND FIXED INCOME INVESTMENT LOSSES, http://www.
subprimelosses.com/ubs-overview.php (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
7See, e.g., Mass. Bricklayers & Masons Trust Funds v. Deutsche Alt-A Sec., Inc., 399 B.R.
119, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The Certificates are allegedly no longer marketable at any price near
the prices paid by Plaintiffs."); Complaint for Violation of Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities
Act of 1933, at 4, Tsereteli v. Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A8, 692 F. Supp. 2d
387 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-CV-10637) ("Plaintiff purchased his Senior Certificates at par for
$1,000 per Certificate at the time of the Offering, but now, at the commencement of the action
herein, they are valued at $60.84 per $100 of par value-a 39% decline in value on a once 'triple-
A' rated bond.").
8 See Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the
2007-08 Credit Crisis, in PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECURITIZATION AFTER THE
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 163, 200 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2009) ("Another interesting
source of potential litigation with respect to CDO purchases is the claim that the pricing of CDO
assets or interests therein was inflated relative to the 'true' value of the assets or interests.").
9See 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (2006).
2011]
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
analyzes the positive and negative impacts of recognizing the price-fraud
theory, concluding that this theory would help prevent the growth of
dangerous market bubbles. Part 1V shows that the price-fraud theory,
although novel, is arguably a viable theory under current securities fraud
jurisprudence. Subpart V analyzes how the price-fraud theory compares to
recognized securities claims related to pricing, concluding that no current
theory covers the same conduct as the price-fraud theory. Finally, Part VI
briefly concludes, urging the legal profession to test the price-fraud theory
in court.
II. SOME ISSUERS AND UNDERWRITERS KNOWINGLY SELL
OVERPRICED SECURITIES, EXACERBATING DANGEROUS ASSET
BUBBLES
Asset bubbles form when the market incorrectly prices securities above
their intrinsic value.' 0  These dangerous bubbles are fed by positive
feedback, with high returns becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy." Some
market participants, without internalizing the negative effects of their
behavior, knowingly ride asset bubbles.12 For example, evidence indicates
that some issuers and underwriters knowingly take advantage of bubble
markets to sell overvalued securities.1 3  This behavior, although
individually rational, is collectively irrational because it contributes to the
growth of market bubbles. 14
A. Asset Bubbles Form when Markets Err
An asset bubble exists when the market price of an asset, such as a
security, exceeds the asset's intrinsic value.' 5 A bubble is characterized by
'
0 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 75-90 (discussing the formation of asset bubbles); Anna
Vander Broek, Bubble Basics, FORBES.COM (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/21/
bubble-tulipmania-crash-pf-ym-in avb 1020youngmoneyinl.html.
11 See supra note 10.
12See supra note 10.
13See Frangois Derrien, IPO Pricing in "Hot" Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the
Table?, 60 J. FINANCE 487, 488 (2005) (suggesting issuers "take advantage of 'windows of
opportunity' periodically offered by overoptimistic investors").
14POSNER, supra note 2, at 106.
"Broek, supra note 10 ("Basically, an economic bubble begins to form when the price of an




rapidly rising prices that cannot be explained by changing fundamentals. 16
One oft-cited example of a securities bubble is the dot.com boom of the
later 1990s and early 2000s.17 Internet start-up companies, often without a
business plan about how to generate revenues, had market capitalizations
exceeding those of established, profitable companies. 18  For example,
eToys,19  Pets.com, 2°  and Netscape 21  were, in retrospect, wildly
overvalued.22
More recently, mortgage-backed securities-and collateralized debt
obligations made up of pools of mortgage-backed securities-were the
23subject of a bubble market. As succinctly stated in Fortune magazine:
16See ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 177 (2007) (quoting the author's
famous December 5, 1996 speech at the American Enterprise Institute's annual dinner and
correlating "unduly escalating asset values" with an "asset bubble"); POSNER, supra note 2, at
10-11; ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 32 (2d ed. 2005) (analyzing a stock
market bubble by looking at "factors that have had an effect on the market not warranted by
rational analysis of economic fundamentals" (emphasis omitted)).
17 See Paul Schultz & Mir Zaman, Do the Individuals Closest to Internet Firms Believe They
Are Overvalued?, 59 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 354-55 (2001).
18See id. (compiling statistics) ("[T]he 299 firms in the sample that were publicly traded at
the end of 1999 had previous quarter revenues of $8.20 billion and lost $4.95 billion .... For
comparison, IBM, Intel, Dell Computer, Amgen, Lucent Technologies and MCI Worldcom
combined had a market capitalization of $1,083 billion, over $270 billion less than that of the
Internet stocks. However, between them these traditional growth stocks had previous quarter
revenues of $59.6 billion; more than 7 times that of all the Internet firms. Their earnings totaled
$7.32 billion as compared to the loss of $4.95 billion by the Internet companies.").
19See SHILLER, supra note 16, at 181 (citing eToys as an example of "'[o]bvious'
[m]ispricing" when comparing its valuation to that of the established toy company Toys "R" Us).
20See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 146 (citing "the phenomenon of Pets.com, which turned a
dubious business model plus a clever ad campaign into an astonishing valuation").
2t See GREENSPAN, supra note 16, at 164 ("The Internet gold rush was on. More and more
start-ups went public to fantastic valuations. Netscape stock continued to climb; by November the
company had a higher market capitalization than Delta Airlines, and Netscape chairman Jim Clark
became the first Internet billionaire.").
22 See Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings,
and the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm 'n, 111 th Cong. 248-49
(2010) [hereinafter Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing] (testimony of Warren E. Buffet,
Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/
testimony/credibility-of-credit-ratings-the-investment-decisions ("After a while, the rising prices
of all internet stocks caused people to be able to raise billions of dollars for things that are
nonsensical.").
23 See id. at 9-10 (preliminary remarks of Chairman Phil Angelides) ("In 2006, $869 billion
worth of mortgage securities were AAA-rated by Moody's. 83 percent went on to be
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"By now everyone knows that those once wildly popular subprime-backed
securities aren't worth as much as was thought., 24 Investors in mortgage-
backed securities have filed a slew of lawsuits against issuers and
underwriters, alleging losses from the substantial decline in the market
value of their investments.25
1. Markets Err Sometimes
The existence of asset bubbles contradicts the long-held assumption,
supported by the efficient-market hypothesis,26 that markets are always
right.27 Indeed, a new wave of economic thought recognizes that investors
sometimes act irrationally, causing market prices to deviate from
fundamental value.28  The Internet bubble is an oft-cited example of a
downgraded. Investors from university endowments to teachers and police officers relying on
pension funds suffered heavy losses.").
24Katie Benner, Navigating Subprime Securities, FORTUNE (Aug. 23, 2007),
http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/22/news/companies/value-subprime securities.fortune/index.htm.
But see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SECURITIZATION AND THE
MORTGAGE CRISIS 19 (2010) (cautiously noting that the "increased default risk of securitized
mortgages may not have been priced in the market").
25Douglas W. Henkin & Tawfiq S. Rangwala, Subprime Litigation Against Issuers and
Underwriters of Mortgage-Backed Securities-Where Are the Actual Losses?, 25 REV. BANKING &
FIN. SERVICES 1, 2 (2009) ("The theory of damages seemingly being advanced in these cases is
that MBS purchasers have suffered compensable 'losses' resulting from allegedly substantial
declines in the market 'value' or 'price' of the purchased securities.").
26 Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in
Tech Stock Carve-Outs, 111 J. POL. ECON. 227, 227 (2003) ("There are two important
implications of the efficient market hypothesis. The first is that it is not easy to earn excess
returns. The second is that prices are 'correct' in the sense that prices reflect fundamental value.
This latter implication is, in many ways, more important than the first.").
27 SHILLER, supra note 16, at 78 ("Many of the major finance textbooks today, which promote
a view of financial markets as working rationally and efficiently, do not provide arguments as to
why feedback loops supporting speculative bubbles cannot occur. In fact, they do not even
mention bubbles or Ponzi schemes. These books convey a sense of orderly progression in
financial markets, of markets that work with mathematical precision." (footnote omitted));
Klarman, supra note 2, at xxxi ("Academics tend to create elegant theories that purport to explain
the real world but in fact oversimplify it. One such theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), holds that security prices always and immediately reflect all available information, an
idea deeply at odds with Graham and Dodd's notion that there is great value to fundamental
security analysis.").
28See Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles and Crashes, 71 ECONOMETRICA
173, 173 (2003) ("We develop a model that challenges the efficient markets perspective. In
particular, we argue that bubbles can survive despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs who are
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discrepancy between market prices and fundamental value. 29 For example,
economists Owen A. Lamont and Richard H. Thaler documented six
instances in which technology stock carve-outs were blatantly mispriced by
the market.30  The recognition that markets sometimes price securities
incorrectly is at the forefront of the national dialogue about the economy,
including discussions about the advisability of value investing and mark-to-
market accounting.3'
Value investing, the strategy followed by luminaries such as Warren
Buffett,32 is premised on the notion that markets sometimes err.3 3 Value
collectively both well-informed and well-financed."); Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and
Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FINANCE 1839, 1839 (1998) (citing evidence)
("In recent years a body of evidence on security returns has presented a sharp challenge to the
traditional view that securities are rationally priced to reflect all publicly available information.");
Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 697 (1988) ("Surely it is irrational for
someone to pay $40 for a 'hot' stock whose likely earnings, coldly calculated, are exactly the
same as those of a $20 stock. Nevertheless, the possibility that investors may not rationally value
stock is one that has the support of an impressive list of authorities."); Justin Fox, Is the Market
Rational?, FORTUNE, Dec. 9, 2002, at 116 ("The organizing principle for this new breed of
scholars is not efficient markets but something called behavioral finance. Behavioral finance
teaches that stock market investors are irrational, that future stock price movements are at least
partly predictable from past behavior, and that careful analysis of past trends and financial reports
can pay off.").
29See SHILLER, supra note 16, at 181 ("There are in fact many examples of financial prices
that, it seems, cannot possibly be right. They are regularly reported in the media. Recently, many
of these examples have been Internet stocks: judging from their prices, the public appears to have
an exaggerated view of their potential."); Fox, supra note 28 ("That real-world phenomenon was
the stock market bubble of the late 1990s. According to strict efficient-markets thinking, there
must be a rational explanation for what happened. Fama describes those sky-high Internet stock
valuations as a risky but not crazy bet that one or two of those money-losing Net companies would
end up as big as Microsoft. But he's almost all alone on this one.").
3°See Lamont & Thaler, supra note 26, at 265 ("We think that a sensible reading of our
evidence should cast doubt on the claim that market prices reflect rational valuations because the
cases we have studied should be ones that are particularly easy for the market to get right.").
3 1 See Steve Forbes, Stop This Horror Before It Starts Again, FORBES, June 28, 2010, at 15
("An economic version of the bubonic plague is ready to reemerge: mark-to-market accounting.
This rule was the principal reason that the financial disaster of 2007-09 threatened to destroy our
financial system."); Megan McArdle, What Would Warren Do?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept.
2009, at 30, 32 ("Right now, the academic literature suggests that value investing has a modest
advantage over a broader market strategy. Better information, more widely available, may
continue to erode that edge.").
32 See Warren E. Buffett, Foreword to GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 2, at xi (stating that the
founders of value investing, Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, "laid out a roadmap for investing
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investors perform fundamental analysis to identify undervalued securities,
with the expectation that the market will eventually price the security
correctly.34  Research firms targeted to value investors, such as
Morningstar, premise their "fair value" estimates on the recognition that, in
the short run, investors sometimes price stocks incorrectly. 35 As explained
by Momingstar:
The father of value investing, Benjamin Graham, explained
that in the short run, the market is like a voting machine-
tallying up which firms are popular and unpopular. But in
the long run, the market is like a weighing machine-
assessing the substance of the company. Target prices are
geared more toward the former, while the Morningstar fair
value estimates are oriented toward the latter.36
The proposition that markets sometimes price irrationally also underlies
the debate over the suspension of mark-to-market accounting of assets.37
Support for the suspension of mark-to-market accounting is premised on the
assertion that active markets sometimes err, while opposition is premised on
the notion that incorrect market prices cannot exist in a truly active
market.38  Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),
companies must record the fair value of certain investment securities on
their balance sheets. 39  Accounting Standards Codification Topic 820,
that I have now been following for 57 years").
33 See Klarman, supra note 2, at xv ("Sometimes the markets price securities correctly, other
times not.").
34 See id. at xiii ("Value investing, today as in the era of Graham and Dodd, is the practice of
purchasing securities or assets for less than they are worth-the proverbial dollar for 50 cents.").
35 See Debbie S. Wang, How Fair Value and Target Price Differ, MORNINGSTAR (July 11,
2003), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=93694&pfvgsection=related articles
1 ("Our fair values are meant to provide an estimate of what the stock is worth, irrespective of
what investors are willing to pay for it.").
36
1d.
37See Allan Sloan, Op-Ed., Don't Blame Mark-to-Market Accounting, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
2008, at D2; Ben Stein, How to Deal with a 3 A.M Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, § 3
(Business), at 4; Elizabeth Williamson & Kara Scannell, Momentum Gathers to Ease Mark-to-
Market Accounting Rule, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A6.
38 See Steve Forbes, Op-Ed., Obama Repeats Bush's Worst Market Mistakes, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 2009, at A13; David Reilly, Elvis Lives, and Mark-to-Market Rules Fuel Crisis,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid--newsarchive&sid=
aD1 lFOjLKly4; Sloan, supra note 37, at D2; Williamson & Scannell, supra note 37, at A6.
39 Henkin & Rangwala, supra note 25, at 5 ("Where a company buys mortgage-backed
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formerly published as Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
Number 157, defines fair value as "the price that would be received to sell
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between
market participants at the measurement date." 40 If an active market exists
for an asset or liability, the market price is the "most reliable evidence of
fair value."41 As a consequence, during the MBS bubble, firms recorded
their MBS and related assets at arguably inflated values.42 When the bubble
popped, financial institutions were forced to drastically mark down the
value of their holdings, arguably exacerbating the effects of the financial
crisis. 43  Commentators and affected parties-including financial
institutions and investors subject to margin calls-argued that the markets
had overreacted and that prices were now irrationally low.44 In response,
securities as an investment, GAAP requires the company to 'mark' the securities for valuation
purposes at certain regular intervals. Statement No. 157 of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board ('FAS 157') guides companies as to how they should measure the 'fair value' of specific
assets and liabilities (including instruments such as mortgage-backed securities) on their books in
order to arrive at the appropriate marks." (footnote omitted)).
4°FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 157, 5 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2008).
4 1 d. 24.
42See Henkin & Rangwala, supra note 25, at 5 n.15 ("[Slhareholder suits challenging the
integrity of a financial institution's own financial statements have questioned whether the models
(and their underlying assumptions) used by companies for fair value measurements under FAS
157 were reasonable and valid."); Andrew Leonard, Bipartisan Bailout Folly, SALON.COM (Oct.
1, 2008), http://www.salon.com/technology/how theworld works/2008/10/0 1/mark to market_
accounting_2/index.html ("So, mark-to-market accounting contributes both to credit bubbles,
which no one on Wall Street ever complains about because they are too busy raking in the
cash ....").
43See POSNER, supra note 2, at 68 ("Accounting rules required the banks to mark down the
value of their mortgage-backed securities and other exotic assets to a reasonable estimate of their
current market value. This reevaluation process ('mark to market') exposed the banks' parlous
financial state with alarming clarity.").
44See Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61
SMU L. REV. 209, 214 (2008) ("The focus, instead, should be on treating the underlying
disease-which in this case is financial-market collapse due to a loss of investor confidence.... If
market prices of these securities can be raised to levels that more closely reflect their real value,
this fear would dissipate."); Sloan, supra note 37, at D2 ("[Financial companies and their allies]
argue that marking the value of complex, illiquid securities to artificially low market prices has
unnecessarily crippled the U.S. and world financial systems by creating billions of illusory losses
on perfectly fine (albeit illiquid) securities, such as collateralized debt obligations linked to
mortgages. Markets for these things, the argument goes, are depressed way below true economic
value."); Leonard, supra note 42 (quoting University of Oregon economist Mark Thoma) ("The
true, fundamental values are different from the values we see today, so, it's like a negative bubble
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Congress explicitly granted the SEC authority to suspend mark-to-market
accounting "if the Commission determines that is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest and is consistent with the protection of investors.
The SEC ultimately declined to suspend mark-to-market accounting,
instead reminding companies that, in a market that is not active, factors
other than market price should influence the fair value determination.46
2. Securities Have an Intrinsic Value
Implicit in the definition of an asset bubble, as a discrepancy between
market price and fundamental value, is the assertion that an asset has a
fundamental, or intrinsic, value. The accepted method of calculating a
security's fundamental value is to perform a discounted cash flow (DCF)
analysis.47 In essence, this method calculates the net present value of the
security's estimated future cash flows.
48
For example, Ross Geddes, in IPOs and Equity Offerings, outlines the
following five steps for valuing a firm through DCF analysis: (1) "forecast
in that sense."); see also Complaint at 7, Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. HSBC Sec. (USA)
Inc., No. 07-CV-9340 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007) ("HSBC was simply exploiting an aberrational
market as a pretext to unreasonably mark down the purported value of the Bonds, demand an
unreasonable amount of additional collateral from Plaintiffs, and then unilaterally confiscate the
Bonds for itself at an artificially steep discount.").
45 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5237 (Supp. II 2009).
46See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING 8 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarketl23008.pdf.
47
1 n re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("Grubman and his analyst team used discounted cash flow (DCF) modeling to support their
valuations and target prices-a common practice in the financial industry."); ROSS GEDDES, IPOS
& EQUITY OFFERINGS 77 (2003) ("An intrinsic valuation is done by forecasting the firm's free
cash flows and discounting them at the firm's cost of capital to arrive at a present value. This is
called a 'discounted cash flow' valuation."); Roger Lowenstein, Introduction to Part : The
Essential Lessons of GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 2, at 47 ("'Intrinsic value' is the worth of an
enterprise to one who owns it 'for keeps.' Logically, it must be based on the cash flow that would
go to a continuing owner over the long run, as distinct from a speculative assessment of its resale
value.").
48See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (1984) (equating a security's
"actual value" with "the aggregate future stream of income accruing to its holder discounted to
present value"); Henkin & Rangwala, supra note 25, at 2 ("[T]he inherent value of an MBS may
not be the price at which it can be sold, but rather the yield or income stream that it generates.").
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future cash flows over the next business cycle;" (2) "make an estimate of
the value of the company beyond the forecast period;" (3) "[use] an
appropriate discount rate [to] calculate the present value of all the cash
flows;" (4) "add any excess cash or marketable securities and non-operating
assets to determine the firm's enterprise value;" and (5) "adjust for the
firm's outstanding debt to determine its equity value."49
The valuation of MBS with DCF analysis entails additional complexity
because of prepayment risk.50 Homeowners are more likely to refinance-
thus prepaying-their mortgages when interest rates drop.5' Therefore, the
likelihood of lowered interest rates must be incorporated into the analysis.52
Fundamental valuation of complex securities is nonetheless possible,
however.53
49GEDDES, supra note 47, at 84; see also Wang, supra note 35 ("To derive the fair value
estimates, we use our proprietary discounted cash-flow (DCF) model. This model assumes that
the stock's value is equal to the total of the free cash flows the company is expected to generate in
the future, discounted back to the present. So, the first step is to project how much cash a firm is
likely to produce over a number of years, and subtract the amount needed for capital
improvements and increases in working capital to keep the business growing. Whatever profits
are left over belong to the shareholders. The second step is to discount those profits to understand
how much they are worth today.").
50 See Henkin & Rangwala, supra note 25, at 5 ("[F]air value measurements must be obtained
via a complex modeling process that takes into consideration predictions about the economy (such
as short-term and long-term interest rates) and the expected performance (e.g. default and
prepayment rates) of the particular mortgages underlying a given security.") (citing Jacob
Boudoukh et al., The Pricing and Hedging of Mortgage-Backed Securities, in ADVANCED FIXED-
INCOME VALUATION TOOLS (Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Bruce Tuckman eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Boudoukh et al., The Pricing and Hedging of Mortgage-Backed Securities]); Jacob Boudoukh et
al., Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities in a Multifactor Interest Rate Environment: A
Multivariate Density Estimation Approach, 10 REV. FIN. STUDIES 405, 409 (1997) [hereinafter
Boudoukh et al., Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities] ("[P]ricing an MBS is not a
straightforward discounted cash flow valuation. This is because the timing and nature of a pool's
cash flow depends on the prepayment behavior of the holders of the individual mortgages within
the pool.").
51 See Boudukh et al., Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 50, at 409.
52
See id.
53 Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs):
Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, llth Cong. 307-08 (2010) [hereinafter
Subprime Lending and Securitization: Hearing] (testimony of Murray C. Barnes, Former
Managing Director, Independent Risk, Citigroup, Inc.), available at http://www.fcic.gov/
hearings/testimony/subprime-lending-and-securitization-and-enterprises (explaining the
discounted cash flow valuation of collateralized debt obligations made up of residential mortgage-
backed securities); Klarman, supra note 2, at xxvi ("Even complex derivatives not imagined in an
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B. Asset Bubbles Threaten the Economy
Bubbles are dangerous because they eventually pop, sending asset
prices crashing down to a level rationally related to the assets'
14fundamentals. The disappearance of asset value in the blink of an eye,
especially when compounded through the use of derivatives and synthetic
products55 in a system with high leverage,5 6 can have devastating impacts.57
Indeed, Judge Posner warns that the bursting of an investment bubble can
cause the "most dangerous type of recession/depression. 5 8
The dot.com bubble popped in 2000, and the market value of Internet
stocks plummeted by approximately forty-five percent.5 9 The mortgage-
backed securities bubble burst in 2009, with securities originally purchased
for millions of dollars now valued at almost nothing.60 The impacts of this
market implosion are still being felt, with U.S. unemployment at near ten
61 62percent, with the U.S. poverty rate at 14.3 percent, and with one in every
381 homes receiving a foreclosure filing in August 2010.63
earlier era can be scrutinized with the value investor's eye.").
54 See Broek, supra note 10 ("The bubble bursts when the price drops, causing a crash and
usually some severe economic collateral damage.").
55 See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
("Synthetic CDOs like ABACUS 2007-ACI contributed to the recent financial crisis by
magnifying losses associated with the downturn in the United States housing market.").
"See Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 235 (testimony of Warren E.
Buffett, Chairman and CEO, Berkshire Hathaway) ("But the size of the pop of the bubble was
accentuated in an enormous way because of the leverage that existed in the system and some of it
was hidden, you know, off-balance-sheet type things.").
57See GREENSPAN, supra note 16, at 177 (quoting the author's famous December 5, 1996
speech at the American Enterprise Institute's annual dinner) ("We as central bankers need not be
concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its
production, jobs, and price stability.... But we should not underestimate, or become complacent
about, the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy.").
58POSNER, supra note 2, at 10 ("It is depression from within, as it were, and is illustrated by
both the depression of the 1930s and the current one, though by other depressions and recessions
as well, including the global recession of the early 1990s.").
59 See Elizabeth Demers & Baruch Lev, A Rude Awakening: Internet Shakeout in 2000, 6
REv. ACCT. STUD. 331,331 (2001).
6°See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 55, at 17-18 (alleging that an investor bought $150 million
worth of synthetic CDO notes at face value and that, within months of closing, the notes were
"nearly worthless").
61BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE:
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/empsit_09032010.pdf.
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C. Asset Bubbles Are Fed by Positive Feedback
Scholars disagree about the root causes of asset bubbles, 64 but they
agree that investor psychology feeds the growth of a bubble.
Characterizations of this psychological basis include "frenzy, ' 6 "gambler's
excitement,',66 a "narcotic,,67 "mania,'68 and "irrational exuberance." 69
This psychological basis operates as a feedback loop. 70 The initial rise
in prices draws investors into the market, which drives prices even higher.7'
62U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRESS RELEASE, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/incomewealth/cb1 0-144.html.
63 RealtyTrac, National Real Estate Trends (Aug. 2010), http://www.realtytrac.com/trend
center/.
64 Compare KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 146 (contending that the stock bubble of the 1990s
was caused by "extreme optimism about the profit potential of information technology" and "the
growing sense of security about the economy"), with POSNER, supra note 2, at 75 (identifying as
underlying causes of the current financial crisis the housing bubble, low interest rates, complicated
financial instruments, and deregulation of financial services), and SHILLER, supra note 16, at 32-
33 (identifying twelve factors that, amplified by investors' irrational exuberance, propelled the
stock market bubble from 1982 to 2000 and the real estate market bubble beginning in the late
1990s).
65 Broek, supra note 10 ("A sort of frenzy will be triggered and the price of the asset will
skyrocket.").
66 SHILLER, supra note 16, at 2 (contending that investors are drawn to a bubble "partly
through envy of others' successes and partly through a gambler's excitement").
67 See Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 249 (testimony of Warren E.
Buffett, Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway) (comparing rising prices to a narcotic).
68 See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 61 ("Financial bubbles are nothing new. From tulip mania
to Internet mania, even the most sensible investors have found it hard to resist getting caught up in
the momentum, to take a long view when everyone else is getting rich.").
69See SHILLER, supra note 16, at 2 ("Irrational exuberance is the psychological basis of a
speculative bubble.").
70See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 47 (2008) ("Psychological,
epidemiological, and economic theory all point to an environment in which feedback of
enthusiasm for speculative assets, or feedback of price increases into further price increases, can
be expected to produce speculative bubbles from time to time.").
71 
See Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 249 (testimony of Warren E.
Buffett, Chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway) (explaining that "rising prices became their
own rationale"); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Hedge Funds and the Technology
Bubble, 59 J. FINANCE 2013, 2015-16 (2004) ("If there is good news today, rational traders buy
and push the price beyond its fundamental value because feedback traders are willing to take up
the position at a higher price in the next period."); J. Bradford DeLong et al., Positive Feedback
Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. FINANCE 379, 380 (1990)
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These profits attract even more investors to buy, sending prices even
higher.72 The opportunity to profit is contagious, 73 chasing prices upward,74
until finally "the scheme runs out of suckers" and prices crash to a rational
level. 7
D. Some Participants Knowingly Buy into Asset Bubbles
Some market participants are aware of the existence of bubbles before
they burst. For example, before the Internet bubble burst, the financial
media repeatedly reported on the bubble's existence.76 In May of 1999,
seventy-two percent of portfolio managers surveyed believed that the stock
market was overvalued.77 Similarly, before the MBS market collapsed,
("Tomorrow, positive feedback traders buy in response to today's price increase and so keep
prices above fundamentals even as rational speculators are selling out and stabilizing prices.").
72See John Cassidy, Dot.con: The Greatest Story Ever Sold, in PANIC: THE STORY OF
MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY 208, 211 (Michael Lewis ed., 2009) (noting that a "self-
reinforcing process" had "propelled stock prices into the stratosphere").
73 See SHILLER, supra note 16, at 2 ("I define a speculative bubble as a situation in which
news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from
person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increases and
bringing in a larger and larger class of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of an
investment, are drawn to it partly through envy of others' successes and partly through a
gambler's excitement.").
74 Leonard, supra note 42 (quoting University of Oregon economist Mark Thoma) ("I think
the idea is that when the market is in a bubble, marking to market (instead of to fundamentals)
inflates the asset values, and that drives further demand, raises the values, and thus chases price
upward.").
75KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 147 (citing SHILLER, supra note 16) ("[A]n asset bubble is a
sort of natural Ponzi scheme in which people keep making money as long as there are more
suckers to draw in. But eventually the scheme runs out of suckers, and the whole thing crashes.").76 See Rebecca Buckman & Aaron Lucchetti, Cooling It: Wall Street Firms Try to Keep
Internet Mania from Ending Badly, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1999, reprinted in PANIC: THE STORY
OF MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY, supra note 72, at 186 (citing evidence of an impending
collapse of the Internet bubble) ("The signs are all there: wild price swings, valuations that seem
from another world, rapid-fire trading by people completely new to the game."); Demers & Lev,
supra note 59, at 332 ("Many market observers had predicted that the 'Internet Bubble' would
eventually burst .... ") (citing authority); Schultz & Zaman, supra note 17, at 356 (referring to an
April 4, 2000 Wall Street Journal article, a July 14, 2000 Wall Street Journal article, and a 1999
book recognizing the existence of the internet bubble); Jack Willoughby, Burning Up, BARRON'S,
Mar. 20, 2000, reprinted in PANIC: THE STORY OF MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY, supra note 72,
at 194 ("When will the Internet Bubble burst? For scores of 'Net upstarts, that unpleasant popping
sound is likely to be heard before the end of this year.").
77See Lauren R. Rublin, Party On! America's Portfolio Managers Grow More Bullish on
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many market participants were aware of the overvaluation of the assets
underlying these securities. 78 For example, in 2005, The Economist printed
an article entitled "After the Fall," which cautioned: "Perhaps the best
evidence that America's house prices have reached dangerous levels is the
fact that house-buying mania has been plastered on the front of virtually
every American newspaper and magazine over the past month., 79 These
participants, with knowledge of the bubble's existence, may purposely buy
into a bubble.8 0 This counterintuitive behavior requires further explanation.
The obvious move if a rational investor suspects that an asset is
overvalued is to sell it short, allowing the investor to profit by buying the
asset at a lower price than the sale price.8 1  This downward pressure on
prices should theoretically prevent bubbles from continuing to grow as
market participants become generally aware of the existence of a bubble.
8 2
In reality, however, short-selling is not an attractive option for many
investors who believe that an asset is overvalued.8 3 Short-selling involves
increased transaction costs, including the fee to borrow the security. 4 More
Stocks and Interest Rates, BARRON'S, May 3, 1999, at 31.
7 See Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 208 (remarks of Chairman
Phil Angelides) ("There were a number of experts, whether it was Robert Schiller [sic] or Mr.
Rubini or Mr. Baker, Dean Baker, there were a number of people who saw this bubble.");
Complaint, supra note 55, at 1 (quoting an alleged July 23, 2007 email by Goldman Sachs
employee Tourre) ("More and more leverage in the system, the whole building is about to collapse
anytime now. . . ."); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Joy of Sachs, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 2009, at
A23 ("Goldman, famously, made a lot of money selling securities backed by subprime
mortgages-then made a lot more money by selling mortgage-backed securities short, just before
their value crashed. All of this was perfectly legal, but the net effect was that Goldman made
profits by playing the rest of us for suckers.").
79After the Fall, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2005, at 11.
8 0See id. ("And there is a troubling similarity between the house-price boom and the dotcom
bubble: investors have been buying houses even though rents will not cover their interest
payments, purely in the expectation of large capital gains-just as investors bought shares in
profitless firms in the late 1990s, simply because prices were rising.").
81See POSNER, supra note 2, at 91 ("One might think a bubble would collapse before it got
too big because investors who realized it was a bubble would sell short-in this case, sell interests
in mortgage-backed securities short.").
"2See id.
83See Lamont & Thaler, supra note 26, at 266 ("Many investors thought that Internet stock
were overpriced during the mania, but only a small minority were willing to take a short position,
and these short sellers were not enough to drive prices down to rational valuations.").
84See id. at 231 ("Shorting costs can explain why a rational arbitrageur fails to short the
overpriced security ... ").
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importantly, short-selling only works if an investor knows when the bubble
will burst, not merely that it will burst at some point.85  As succinctly
explained by John Maynard Keynes: "The market can stay irrational longer
than you can stay solvent.,
86
A rational investor who knows that a bubble exists may instead decide
to ride the bubble. 87 The rational investor understands the feedback loop
and recognizes that short-term gains are possible during the bubble's
88expansion. Indeed, there is evidence that market participants were
purposefully riding the Internet and MBS bubbles.89 Economists studying
the Internet bubble have concluded that much of the high demand for these
stocks came from short-term traders, including hedge funds, who
85See POSNER, supra note 2, at 91 ("But short selling in a bubble is very risky unless the
bubble is expected to burst very soon."); SHILLER, supra note 16, at 178-79 ("If indeed one knew
today that the market would do poorly over the next ten or twenty years, but did not know exactly
when it would begin to do poorly and could not prove one's knowledge to a broad audience, then
there would be no way to profit significantly from this knowledge. There is thus no substantial
reason to think that the smart money must necessarily eliminate such stock mispricing."); Jay R.
Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review oflPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FINANCE 1795,
1822 (2002) ("The recent bubble has made it amply clear that even if there is systematic long-run
underperformance, it is difficult or impossible to exploit it in a reliable manner. Many short
sellers lost a great deal of money in Internet bubble IPOs, and had to close out their shorts before
they would have paid off.").
86POSNER, supra note 2, at 92 (quoting Keynes).
87 See id. at 105; SHILLER, supra note 16, at 71-72 ("Conceivably, a bubble might exist only
because people think that there is a temporary bubble and want to ride with it for a while.").
88See POSNER, supra note 2, at 88 ("Especially when interest rates are low, riding a bubble
can be rational even though you know it's a bubble. For you can't know when it will burst, and
until it does it is expanding and that means that values are rising rapidly, so that if you climb off
the bubble you will have forgone a large profit opportunity."); DeLong et al., supra note 71, at
383 (describing trend-chasing by exchange rate forecasting services) ("[F]orecasting services were
issuing buy recommendations while maintaining that the dollar was overpriced relative to its
fundamental value."); Josd A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative
Bubbles, 111 J. POL. EcON. 1183, 1208 (2003) ("With a short-sale constraint, an asset owner has
an option to sell the asset to other agents with more optimistic beliefs. Agents value this option
and consequently pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they
believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more.").
89 See Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The "Less Than" Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis:
Requiring More Prooffrom Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 81,
125-26 (2004) ("[T]hose investors who recognized the existence or likelihood of the bubble did
not put in sufficient selling pressure to cause the bubble to burst.... [S]ince the sector had done




recognized the growing bubble and expected to profit from rising prices.
9
0
In an oft-cited example of this strategy during the MBS bubble, Citigroup's
then-CEO said in July 2007 of his firm's investments: "When the music
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the
music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing."91
Investors making the rational decision to ride a market bubble must
assess when the bubble will ultimately burst. 92 If they leave the market too
soon, they leave money on the table.93  If they wait too long, they risk
losing everything in the eventual market collapse.94 The individually
rational decision to ride a bubble until just before it collapses is collectively
irrational, however.95  The bubble-riders' speculative behavior adds
additional positive information to the feedback loop, exacerbating the
growth of the bubble. 96  The bigger the bubble, the more devastating the
90See Brunnermeier & Nagel, supra note 71, at 2016 (examining the holdings of hedge funds
during the technology bubble) ("Both predictions-sophisticated investors riding the bubble and
gains from doing so-are consistent with our findings."); Paul Schultz, Downward-Sloping
Demand Curves, the Supply of Shares, and the Collapse of Internet Stock Prices, 63 J. FINANCE
351, 355 (2008) (citing John H. Cochrane, Stocks as Money: Convenience Yield and the Tech-
Stock Bubble, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES 175 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 2003)) ("With a high
demand for these stocks and few available shares, short-term traders who expected to turn over
their positions and reap trading profits in only a few days willingly paid more than the intrinsic
value of the stocks.").
91POSNER, supra note 2, at 88-89.
92See Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 28, at 174 ("[R]ational arbitrageurs understand that
the market will eventually collapse but meanwhile would like to ride the bubble .... Ideally, they
would like to exit the market just prior to the crash.... [A]rbitrageurs realize that they will, for a
variety of reasons, come up with different solutions to this optimal timing problem.").
9See id. at 174-75 ("In the equilibrium of our model, arbitrageurs stay in the market until the
subjective probability that the bubble will burst in the next trading round is sufficiently high.
Arbitrageurs who get out of the market just prior to the crash make the highest profit.
Arbitrageurs who leave the market very early make some profit, but forgo much of the higher rate
of appreciation of the bubble."); POSNER, supra note 2, at 105 ("[T]here is rational reluctance to
forgo lucrative profit opportunities by bailing out before one senses that the plateau (followed by
the inevitable crash) is about to be reached.").
94See Abreu & Brunnermeier, supra note 28, at 175 ("For example, when Stanley
Druckenmiller, who managed George Soros' $8.2 billion Quantum Fund, was asked why he didn't
get out of internet stocks earlier even though he knew that technology stocks were overvalued, he
replied that he thought the party wasn't going to end so quickly.").
95 POSNER, supra note 2, at 106 ("Risky behavior of the sort I have been describing was
individually rational during the bubble. But it was collectively irrational.").
96See DeLong et al., supra note 71, at 393-94 ("This paper has argued, to the contrary, that in
the presence of positive feedback investors it might be rational for speculators to jump on the
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ramifications from its eventual bursting. Yet, the speculators riding the
bubble do not internalize the risk of eventual financial collapse.97
Indeed, the members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission have
repeatedly noted that no market participant internalized the risk created by
issuing mortgage-related securities at prices buoyed by the housing bubble.
Commissioner Byron S. Georgiou articulated this problem: "Well, really, in
the securitization process, we've discovered through the course of our
hearings that really, almost everybody involved has nothing to lose."
98
Chairman Phil Angelides queried: "[W]here is the responsibility along the
chain for ensuring the quality of the products that are moved into the
system?" 99 Vice Chairman Bill Thomas unfavorably contrasted the liability
of securities issuers to the liability of consumer product manufacturers: "[I]f
you sell a baby blanket, you're supposed to make sure that it doesn't bum
easily."100
E. Securities Are Sometimes Knowingly Issued at a Price Above
Their Fundamental Value in a Bubble
Issuers and underwriters often set the offering price of securities above
their intrinsic value when selling into a bubble market. 01 Sometimes, they
do so with knowledge that they are profiting from a growing bubble.
bandwagon and not to buck the trend. Rational speculators who expect some future buying by
noise traders buy today in the hope of selling at a higher price tomorrow. Moreover, purchases by
rational speculators can make positive feedback traders even more excited and so move prices
even further away from fundamental values than they would reach in the absence of rational
speculators.").
97 See KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 62-63 (arguing that financial bubbles are exacerbated, and
perhaps caused, by moral hazard and defining moral hazard as "any situation in which one person
makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go
badly"); POSNER, supra note 2, at 111-12 ("In sum, rational maximization by businessmen and
consumers, all pursuing their self-interest more or less intelligently within a framework of
property and contract rights, can set the stage for an economic catastrophe.").
9 8Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 271-72 (remarks of Byron S.
Georgiou, Commissioner) (identifying mortgage brokers, bankers, lawyers, accountants, and
credit rating agencies as market participants with "nothing to lose").
9Subprime Lending and Securitization: Hearing, supra note 53, at 247 (remarks of Phil
Angelides, Chairman).
100Id. at 250 (remarks of Hon. Bill Thomas, Vice Chairman).
101 See Derrien, supra note 13, at 514 ("[I]f noise trader sentiment is bullish at a given time,
we expect both the issuer and the companies in the same industry to be overpriced with respect to
their intrinsic values.").
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Economist Robert Shiller anecdotally describes this phenomenon during the
Internet bubble:
More common than the examples of criminal behavior,
however, are examples of people who stayed entirely
within the law and exploited a boom, building businesses
that they did not themselves believe in. These are the cases
of disingenuity rather than frauds.
Some of these people have already taken their money
and gone home. Since 2000, many top managers of tech
companies that were built promoting a fundamentally
flawed business concept have made their initial public
offerings, and have retired to their estates, and hardly care
that the price of their stocks has dropped so far.
102
Some scholars contend that investment banks purposefully stoked the
Internet bubble in order to profit from it.
10 3
Many investors, lawmakers, and commentators make the same charge
against investment banks who were selling MBS.1' 4 The general view is
that investment banks were selling MBS and related securities that they did
not believe in, at prices far above their rational level.1
0 5
1. Securities Are Sometimes Issued at an Irrationally High Price
in a Bubble
Most registered offerings of securities, including initial public stock
offerings and MBS offerings, 10 6 are accomplished via an underwriter. 107
102 SHILLER, supra note 16, at 77.
103See Ritter & Welch, supra note 85, at 1807-08 (citing evidence that "investment banking
firms were making other efforts to encourage overvaluations during the Internet bubble, such as
subsequently issuing 'buy' recommendations when market prices had risen far above the offer
price").
'°4See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE, July 9-23,
2009, at 52, 59 ("Then [Goldman Sachs] sold investors on the idea that, because a bunch of those
mortgages would turn out to be OK, there was no reason to worry so much about the [other] ones:
The [investment], as a whole, was sound. Thus, junk-rated mortgages were turned into AAA-
rated investments.").
105 See, e.g., Daniel Carty, Goldman Sachs Under Microscope: Key Moments from Hearing,
ECONWATCH (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-20003568-503983.
html.
'6See SEC ET AL., STAFF REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED
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The underwriter, in consultation with the issuer, sets the initial prices of
securities. 108 The underwriter is not required to set the price at a level
rationally related to the securities' underlying value. 109
Rather, the underwriter sets a price related to what the market will bear.
Typically, an IPO price is set in a multi-step bookbuilding process,
designed to match price with market demand." l0 First, the underwriter
makes a price prediction during the beauty contest stage, when the
underwriter is attempting to convince the issuer to choose it as managing
underwriter. 11  Then, the underwriter performs a valuation of the
SECURITIES MARKETS 19 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked
.htm ("Unlike GSE and Ginnie Mae MBS, offerings of private-label MBS are subject to the
registration requirements of the federal securities laws. As such the offer and sale of these
securities must be done pursuant to a registration statement filed with the Commission or pursuant
to an exemption.... Market participants have indicated that the vast majority of private-label
MBS, over 98% in 2001, are sold in registered transactions with the remainder being sold in Rule
144A transactions.").
1°7See id. at 18 ("Private-label MBS typically are offered initially through
underwriters...."); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisors, 65 Bus. LAW. 395, 428 (2010) ("When a corporation raises money through the sale of
securities to the public, it typically hires a broker-dealer to distribute the securities in a firm
commitment or best efforts underwriting.").
108See Municipal Securities Disclosure, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778, 37,787 (proposed Sept. 28,
1988) ("The underwriter stands between the issuer and the public purchasers, assisting the issuer
in pricing and, at times, in structuring the financing and preparing disclosure documents.");
Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyer's Guide to the Operation of Underwriting Syndicates, 26 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 319, 345 (1991) ("The pricing of an offering is completed in a meeting between the issuer
and the manager."); Steven Drucker & Christopher Mayer, Inside Information and Market
Making in Secondary Mortgage Markets 1 (Jan. 6, 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/
units/finance/pdf/underwriters-MBS-Drucker-Mayer-01-2008.pdf ("Underwriters serve as the
middle-man in debt securitization markets, collecting and distributing information to potential
investors, setting initial prices of securities, and providing post-issuance price support.").
1°9See GEDDES, supra note 47, at 94 ("A company valuation is the starting point in setting the
price of an IPO. Many dot.coms that were worthless based on a DCF calculation at the time of
their flotations achieved billion dollar market capitalizations. Similarly, the market will
sometimes undervalue businesses.").
"' See id. at 70 ("In the USA and Canada, bookbuilding is the standard way of conducting an
IPO: the vast majority of IPOs and secondary offerings are conducted and priced in this
manner.").
"'See id. at 76 ("[T]he banks involved in the flotation must provide an indicative valuation
(price range) at the beginning of the offering process. In fact the first valuation analysis is usually
done when investment banks are pitching for the lead manager mandate. To help win the business
they will present the company or selling shareholder with a preliminary valuation. The valuation
will be refined as the bankers learn more about the company during due diligence."); Allen, supra
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security, 112 incorporating both a fundamental analysis and a market-based
analysis, and sets an initial price range for the stock.' 1 3 This price range is
included in the preliminary prospectus. 14 Next, the underwriter shops the
security around in a "roadshow," seeking expressions of interest from
potential investors at various prices. 115 At the end of the bookbuilding
process, and on the eve of the offering, the underwriter sets the final price
based on the bids gathered."l6  This final price is a product of what the
market will bear and need not relate to the intrinsic value of the security." 7
note 108, at 330 ("The price at which an investment banking firm claims it can sell a company's
securities can be a major consideration in selecting a manager from a group of investment banking
firms.").
112See Allen, supra note 108, at 331 ("The analyst will determine the company's relative
strength, position within its industry, cash flow, market share and potential to increase that share,
growth potential, asset value and similar matters.").
13 See GEDDES, supra note 47, at 77 ("Senior bankers use their experience and judgment
when determining the most appropriate valuation method to use. But they will always use more
than one technique in valuing a company's shares.").
114See id. at 76 ("Before bookbuilding commences, the managers set a price range to give
investors an idea of what value they consider reasonable."); Allen, supra note 108, at 346 ("In an
IPO, the preliminary prospectus sets forth an expected price range within which the securities are
expected to be offered. The price is based upon the value that the manager has placed on the
company issuing the securities.").
nSSee JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 119 (10th ed. 2007) ("During
the waiting period, the underwriters may undertake a series of 'roadshows' by which they and
some members of the issuer's senior management travel around the country to meet with
securities analysts, institutional investors, and possible a few very wealthy individual investors, in
order to market the offering."); accord GEDDES, supra note 47, at 70 ("Starting with a likely
offering price range, syndicate members solicit expressions of interest with respect to both size of
order and number of shares the institutional investor is interested in. Thus, a book is built which
gives the company, selling shareholders and investment bank a clear picture of demand for shares
at different price levels."); Moonchul Kim & Jay R. Ritter, Valuing IPOs, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
425 (1999) ("Underwriters usually contact potential buyers, get information about the market
demand, and try to augment the demand through the road show.").
11
6
See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 115, at 119 ("Conversely, if the offering is oversubscribed,
the underwriters will know that it is likely to be 'hot."'); GEDDES, supra note 47, at 71 ("Once the
bookbuilding process is concluded, the lead bank aggregates all the bids into a demand curve and
chooses the issue price according to its discretion.").
17 See Allen, supra note 108, at 346 ("The actual public offering price securities being sold in
an IPO may be materially different from the range of prices set forth in the preliminary
prospectus. If there is great enthusiasm for the issuer's securities during the marketing stage of
the offering, the public offering price will increase. If the market does not receive the offering
favorably, the public offering price will be reduced or the number of shares being offered will be
reduced to create a greater demand. In either case, a change in the offering price or the number of
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Indeed, if an issue is perceived by potential investors as "hot," the
underwriter may set the offering price above the initial file range, despite
the fact that the file range was influenced at least partially by
fundamentals." 18  Similarly, an underwriter usually sets the MBS offering
price in negotiated transactions with investors at prices related to prevailing
market prices, regardless of whether those market prices bear any
relationship with fundamental value.' 19
Issuers of securities in an IPO 120 or in a registered offering of MBS
12 1
are required to "describe the various factors considered in determining [the]
shares being offered would indicate that the market placed a higher or lower value on the
company than did the manager.").
"18See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 115, at 119; accord GEDDES, supra note 47, at 73 ("The
lead manager has significant discretion in setting the price and, in most markets can set the price
outside the initial range if there is sufficient/insufficient demand to merit doing so."); Kim &
Ritter, supra note 115, at 425 ("It is common for the preliminary offer price range to be adjusted
before a final offer price is set."); Underwriters Raise Offer Price for Netscape Communication,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, reprinted in PANIC: THE STORY OF MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY,
supra note 72, at 163 (reporting that, "[f]aced with surprisingly strong demand for an initial public
offering," Netscape Communications Corporation had raised the size and price of its initial stock
offering).
119 See Subprime Lending and Securitization: Hearing, supra note 53, at 130 (testimony of
Susan Mills, Managing Director of Mortgage Finance, Citi Markets & Banking, Global
Securitized Markets ) ("We would market the RMBS bonds to investors, solicit feedback from
those investors regarding the transaction, and finalize the structure and pricing."); GSR Mortg.
Loan Trust 2007-3F, Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus (Form 424B5) (Apr. 25, 2007) ("The
underwriter, Goldman, Sachs & Co., will offer the offered certificates from time to time in
negotiated transactions or otherwise at varying prices to be determined at the time of sale. The
proceeds to the depositor, GS Mortgage Securities Corp., from the sale of the offered certificates
will be approximately 99.38% of the class principal balance of the offered certificates plus
accrued interest, before deducting expenses."); Credit Suisse First Bos. Mortg. Sec. Corp.,
Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus (Form 424B5) (Oct. 23, 2001) ("The underwriters propose
to offer the offered certificates from time to time for sale in negotiated transactions or otherwise,
at market prices prevailing at the time of sale, at prices related to the prevailing market prices or at
negotiated prices.").
120 Item 5 of Form S-1 (the form used to register IPOs) requires issuers to "[f]urnish the
information required by Item 505 of Regulation S-K." SEC, FORM S-I, at 4 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-l.pdf; see also 17 C.F.R. §239.11 (2010). The
requirements contained in Item 505 of Regulation S-K are triggered "[wjhere common equity is
being registered for which there is no established public trading market." See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.505.
121 Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1506, 1522 (proposed Jan. 7, 2005) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 239) (explaining that Item 5 of Form S-1, which requires disclosure about
"Determination of Offering Price," must be completed for offerings of asset-backed securities).
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offering price" in the registration statement. 122 As noted by William W.
Barker, then Senior Counsel to the Division of Corporation Finance at the
SEC, these disclosures are essentially meaningless: "Unfortunately, the
item invites boilerplate responses. For example, statements that the 'initial
public offering price has been arbitrarily determined' or 'the offering price
has been established by negotiations between the underwriter and
representative' do not by themselves provide meaningful disclosure. 123
As a consequence of this market-based price-setting process, securities
issued into a bubble market are sometimes overpriced as compared to
fundamental value. One piece of evidence of this inflationary effect on
offering prices is the high percentage of offerings in which the final offering
price exceeds the original file price range during a market bubble.,2 4 In
1999 and 2000, the height of the Internet bubble, IPO prices exceeded the
original file price range in 47.7% and 38.7% of offerings, respectively.
25
By contrast, in the years 1991 through 1998, the IPO price exceeded the file
price range in only 23.6% of offerings, on average; and in the years 2001
through 2008, the IPO price exceeded the file price range in only 20.5% of
offerings, on average. 126
A second piece of evidence is the poor long-term performance of stocks
issued during a market bubble. Economists have documented that IPO
stocks issued during high-demand and bubble markets perform poorly in
the long term because they are issued at prices exceeding their fundamental
12217 C.F.R. § 229.505.
123 William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of
1933, 52 BUs. LAW. 65, 106 (1996); accord GEDDES, supra note 47, at 94 (quoting Fairchild
Semiconductor's IPO preliminary prospectus) ("Prior to this offering, there has been no public
market for our Class A Common Stock. The initial public offering price for the Class A Common
Stock will be determined by negotiation between us [Fairchild] and Credit Suisse First Boston
Corporation [the lead manager], and does not reflect the market price for Class A Common Stock
following the offering."); Stout, supra note 28, at 656-57 & n.226 ("[I]t is the custom to state in
an [P0 prospectus that offering price has been determined arbitrarily .... Another common
phrase is that price has been determined by negotiations between the issuer and underwriter."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
124 See GEDDES, supra note 47, at 73 ("In fact, under 50 per cent of US offerings between
1990 and 2001 were priced within the initial price range, as set out in the preliminary
prospectus .... Note the leap in proportion of offerings being priced above the high end of the
initial price range in 1999 and 2000.").





value.1 27 Similarly, MBS prices have plummeted from their offering prices
in the height of the bubble, sometimes becoming virtually worthless.
1 28
Economists Alexander Ljungqvist, Vikram Nanda, and Rajdeep Singh
explain the relationship between an irrationally high offering price and poor
long-term performance: "Underperformance relative to the offer price is a
stronger (and novel) prediction. It follows because the offer price will
exceed fundamental value by an amount equal to the issuer's share in the
surplus extracted from the sentiment investors.' 29
The conclusion that securities are sometimes overpriced at the time of
issue when selling into a bubble market seems to contradict the so-called
underpricing phenomenon, which has been the subject of much scholarly
attention. On closer examination, however, this apparent contradiction
disappears because the two conclusions use different measures of a price's
correctness. As explained below, the conclusion that securities are
overpriced at issue is premised on the gap between the offering price and
fundamental value, while the conclusion that securities are underpriced at
issue is premised on the gap between the offering price and the closing
market price on the first day of trading. Indeed, economists Michael
Adams, Barry Thornton, and George Hall humorously summarize both
conclusions: "Does IPO stand for Instant Profit Opportunity or It's
127See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Uniformly Least Powerful Tests of Market Efficiency,
55 J. FIN. ECoN. 361, 382, 388 (2000) [hereinafter Loughran & Ritter, Uniformly Least Powerful
Tests of Market Efficiency] (finding that, consistent with the "supply response hypothesis" that
"IPOs appear to underperform only in high-volume periods"); Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The
New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FINANCE 23, 46 (1995) [hereinafter Loughran & Ritter, The New Issues
Puzzle] (citing studies "[c]onsistent with the hypothesis that IPOs have poor subsequent returns
due to misvaluations at the time of going public"); Ritter & Welch, supra note 85, at 1819 ("IPOs
from 1999 and 2000 performed poorly by any measure during the well-known collapse of the
Internet bubble. For IPOs from calendar year 2000, the average return from the closing price on
its first day of trading until September 2001 was -64.7 percent.").
128See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 55, at 17-18 (alleging that an investor bought $150
million worth of synthetic CDO notes at face value and that, within months of closing, the notes
were "nearly worthless").
129Alexander Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing, 79 J. Bus.
1667, 1670 (2006) (modeling an IPO company's optimal response to so-called "sentiment"
investors); see also Michael Adams et al., Asymmetric Price Adjustment: Are IPO Prices Too
"Sticky"?, 7 J. Bus. & ECON. REs. 55, 58 (2009) ("Specifically, a high-demand IPO, which is due
to investors' over optimism, is more likely to create a speculative bubble. The speculative bubble
may temporarily push the stock price above its intrinsic value, followed by long-run price




Probably Over-priced? The conundrum is that both answers are generally
correct."
'1 30
Underpricing is defined as the difference between the offering price and
the closing price on the first day of trading.' 31 It is well-documented that
the closing price is usually higher than the offering price, often substantially
so. 132 For example, in 2004, economists Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam and
Bhaskaran Swaminathan documented that "first-day returns of initial public
offerings (IPOs) have averaged ten to fifteen percent in recent decades,
giving rise to a well-documented phenomenon known as IPO underpricing,
where the underpricing is calculated with respect to the offer price chosen
by the issuers and their investment bankers.' 33 This phenomenon has led
to myriad theories about why issuers are leaving money on the table by
130 Michael Adams et al., 1PO Pricing Phenomena: Empirical Evidence of Behavioral Biases,
6 J. Bus. & ECON. RES. 67, 67 (2008).
'31 See id. ("The initial under pricing of the IPS is the difference between the price obtained
by the shares at the close of the first trading day and the price of the offer, adjusting for the market
return in the same period."); COFFEE ET AL., supra note 115, at 76 ("[T]here is considerable
evidence that underwriters 'underprice' a new issue so that the investors who purchase in the
initial offering will receive an immediate return over the first day or two of trading."); Ritter &
Welch, supra note 85, at 1802 ("Academics use the terms first-day returns and underpricing
interchangeably."); Chitru S. Fernando et al., Is the Offer Price in IPOs Informative?
Underpricing, Ownership Structure, and Performance 10 (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 01-33, 2002) ("[W]e calculate underpricing as the raw return from the offer price to the
closing price on the first trading day.").
132 See Adams et al., supra note 130, at 67 ("A well known and documented phenomenon is
the first day return typically generated by IPOs. This is also known as the initial under pricing
practice of investment bankers."); Kim, supra note 115, at 422 (recognizing the "short-run
underpricing phenomenon"); Andreas Oehler et al., Is the Investor Sentiment Approach the
Solution to the IPO Underpricing Phenomenon?, 13 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 127, 127
("Therefore, it is rather surprising that most of the firms show a significant increase in share price
between the offering and the first trading day. These astonishing and time varying initial returns
have been labeled the underpricing phenomenon and have been confirmed for all major stock
markets around the world." (citation omitted) (citing Tim Loughran et al., Initial Public Offerings:
International Insights, 2 PAC.-BAsiN FIN. J. 165-199 (1994))); Laurence Zuckerman, With
Internet Cachet, Not Profit, a New Stock Is Wall St. 's Darling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1995, at Al,
reprinted in PANIC: THE STORY OF MODERN FINANCIAL INSANITY, supra note 72, at 165, 167
("Most initial public offerings are priced so that they will end the first day of trading with a small
profit for investors.").
133 See Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam & Bhaskaran Swaminathan, Are IPOs Really
Underpriced?, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 811, 811 (2004).
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underpricing their issues, including that issuers are attempting to
compensate investors for the risk of buying a new issue.
134
The relationship between underpricing and long-term value supports the
conclusion that the offering price is sometimes higher than merited by the
fundamentals when selling into a bubble market. Indeed, studying this
relationship, several economists have concluded that IPOs, rather than
being underpriced, are overpriced as compared to intrinsic value.'35 One
would expect that underpricing would be most pronounced when an issuer
is selling into a bubble market because the growing bubble would drive the
high first-day returns. As a corollary, one would also anticipate that the
most underpriced securities would perform the worst in the long term
because the popping bubble would send the price plummeting below both
the first-day closing price and the offering price. Indeed, consistent with
these hypotheses, the data shows that the most underpriced issues perform
the worst in the long term.
136
134see COFFEE ET AL., supra note 115, at 76 ("This run-up in price is intended to compensate
the IPO investors for the riskiness of new offerings ....").
135 Purnanandam & Swaminathan, supra note 133, at 812 ("Our analysis reveals the surprising
result that IPOs are systematically overvalued at the offer price relative to peer firms. We find
that in a sample of more than 2,000 relatively large capitalization IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the
median IPO is overvalued by about 14% to 50%, depending on the matching criteria, relative to its
industry peers."); id. at 845 (finding "initial IPO overvaluation at the offer price and even more
overvaluation in the after market, followed ultimately by long-run reversals"); Giordano Cogliati,
Stefano Paleari & Silvio Vismara, IPO Pricing: Growth Rates Implied in Offer Prices 18 (April
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Baylor Law Review) (comparing 184 European IPO
prices, which were priced using the discounted cash flow model, to the firms' actual performance
over the succeeding five years) ("We fird that the median IPO firm is overvalued at the offering
by 74%.").
136 See Adams et al., supra note 130, at 69 ("Empirical studies have demonstrated that the first
day's abnormal return is usually short-lived and that an IPO is not always underpriced in the long
term. In fact, IPOs may be generally overpriced based upon the longer term performance of risk
equivalent securities.") (citing Loughran & Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, supra note 127, at 23);
Purnanandam & Swaminathan, supra note 133, at 827 (differentiating between underpriced and
overpriced IPOs via a comparative analysis) ("Overvalued IPOs provide higher returns than
undervalued IPOs on the first day of trading."); Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO
Underpricing Changed Over Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5, 30 (2004) ("For example, of the 19 IPOs
with a first-day return of more than 300% during the internet bubble, the average buy-and-hold
return from the first closing price until the end of December 2002 is -95.0%. Measured from the
offer price, the average return through December 2002 (or the delisting date, if earlier) is -73.7%
for these 19 IPOs, compared to -43.5% for the other bubble period IPOs.").
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2. Issuers and Underwriters Sometimes Knowingly Set the
Offering Price Above Fundamental Value
Evidence further suggests that some issuers and underwriters knowingly
set the offering price at a level higher than supported by the fundamentals-
intentionally profiting from a bubble market.
First, there is anecdotal evidence to support knowing overpricing in
specific scenarios. For instance, as alleged in the infamous SEC v.
Goldman Sachs & Co. complaint related to the sale of synthetic CDOs, a
hedge fund employee stated in January 2007:
It is true that the market is not pricing the subprime
RMBS wipeout scenario. In my opinion this situation is
due to the fact that rating agencies, CDO managers and
underwriters have all the incentives to keep the game
going, while "real money" investors have neither the
analytical tools nor the institutional framework to take
action before the losses that one could anticipate based [on]
the "news" available everywhere are actually realized.
137
More compelling is the statistical evidence suggesting that issuers time
issues to take advantage of market overvaluation. Numerous economists
have concluded, after studying the long-term poor performance of IPOs 38
and the cyclical volume of IPOs, 139 that issuers are seizing a window of
opportunity to issue stock when the market is overvaluing it. 140 Economists
137 Complaint, supra note 55, at 17-18.
1
38 See Loughran & Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, supra note 127, at 32-35 (demonstrating
that, measured five years after issuance, companies issuing stock in an IPO during the period 1970
to 1990 significantly underperformed relative to nonissuing matching companies and relative to
the S&P 500).
139 See id. at 47 (citing "[e]vidence that cycles in IPO volume are due to issuers taking
advantage of windows of opportunity").
140See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate
Stock Returns, 55 J. FINANCE 2219, 2248 (2000) ("On the basis of this collection of evidence, we
conclude that market timing drives our results. Managers appear to time their issues to exploit not
only the idiosyncratic component of their firm's returns but also the market component.");
Ljungqvist et al., supra note 129, at 1694 ("[A]s the market heats up, some firms may go public
for opportunistic reasons, purely to extract surplus from sentiment investors."); Loughran &
Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, supra note 127, at 46 (interpreting their evidence as "consistent
with a market where firms take advantage of transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity
when, on average, they are substantially overvalued"); Ritter & Welch, supra note 85, at 1799
("The academic literature has tended to view increases in the valuation of comparable firms as
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Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey Wurgler explain the logical relationship
between market overvaluation and issue timing as follows:
The story is intuitive. When investor sentiment causes, for
example, overvalued equity prices, managers prefer to issue
equity. Correlated investor sentiment implies that other
firms will be overvalued at the same time and will therefore
tend to make similar financing decisions. The final element
is that arbitrage forces slowly-but eventually with some
success-push the market back down to its efficient
value. 141
This market timing evidence reinforces the anecdotal evidence that at
least some issuers and underwriters, despite the resultant damage to their
reputations, 142 are knowingly setting the offering price at a level buoyed by
a market bubble.
1II. HOLDING ISSUERS AND UNDERWRITERS LIABLE FOR PRICE
FRAUD WOULD HELP PREVENT THE GROWTH OF ASSET BUBBLES
Under the theory of price fraud, an issuer or underwriter who knowingly
overpriced a security, as compared to its fundamental value, would
potentially be subject to securities fraud liability. The recognition of price
fraud as a viable securities fraud theory would help prevent the growth of
asset bubbles by forcing these market participants to internalize the risk of
contributing to growing bubbles, by inserting negative feedback into
growing bubbles, and by refocusing the investment community on
fundamentals. 43 Although the price-fraud theory could have some negative
effects, these effects would be outweighed by the benefits.
reflecting improved growth opportunities. But more favorable investor sentiment could also play
a role in the increased valuations. When investors are overoptimistic, firms respond by issuing
equity in a 'window of opportunity."').
141 Baker & Wurgler, supra note 140, at 2248.
14 2See Schultz & Zaman, supra note 17, at 369 ("Underwriters, like venture capitalists, return
to the initial public offering market repeatedly. Their desire to protect their reputation provides an
incentive to avoid selling overpriced IPOs.").
143 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 112 ("[T]he economic emergency is a failure of the market to
internalize the costs of an economy-wide catastrophe.").
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A. The Price-Fraud Theory Would Force Issuers and Underwriters
to Internalize the Risk of Their Behavior
The prospect of price-fraud liability would force issuers and
underwriters to internalize the risk that, by issuing overpriced securities,
they are contributing to the growth of an asset bubble. As discussed above
in Part II.D, it is often rational for an individual actor to ride a bubble
knowingly in order to profit from it.' 44 Collectively, however, this behavior
is irrational because it feeds the growth of the bubble, threatening the entire
financial system. 145
The solution is to somehow force the individual actors to internalize the
societal effects of their behavior.1 46 As humorously explained by Byron S.
Georgiou, Commissioner of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
market participants should be forced to "eat their own cooking."
'147
Proposals to accomplish this have included paying market participants in
the subject securities148 and aligning executives' incentives with overall
economic welfare. 149 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act requires securitizers or originators of asset-
backed securities to retain some of the credit risk.150
The potential for price-fraud liability would accomplish the goal of
forcing issuers and underwriters to internalize the risk of feeding a growing
asset bubble. Rather than lacking an incentive to price to fundamentals,
issuers and underwriters would weigh the potential fraud liability against
the benefits of riding a market bubble. As a consequence, in a growing
bubble, issuers and underwriters would have the incentive to set offering
prices below what the market could bear, signaling the existence of a
market bubble to the public.' 51 Rather than feeding a growing bubble with
144See id. at 105; supra Part II.D.
1
4 5 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 106, 111-12.
'46See id. at 112 ("[T]he economic emergency is a failure of the market to internalize the
costs of an economy-wide catastrophe.").
1
4 7 See Subprime Lending and Securitization: Hearing, supra note 53, at 189-90 (remarks of
Byron S. Georgiou, Commissioner).
141 See id. at 190; Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 272 (remarks of
Byron S. Georgiou, Commissioner).
149See POSNER, supra note 2, at 302.
50 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
sec. 941, § 15G, 124 Stat. 1376, 1891-96 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11).
1
51 See SHILLER, supra note 16, at 225 (recommending as part of his "call to action" to
prevent speculative bubbles, that opinion leaders, such as the Fed Chair, "try to call the attention
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positive feedback, this insertion of negative information into the feedback
loop would have a stabilizing effect, quelling the bubble's growth.
152
B. The Price-Fraud Theory Would Promote Attention to
Fundamental Value
Moreover, issuers' and underwriters' attention to fundamental value
when setting offering prices, coupled with the public's recognition of
forming bubbles, would refocus the investment community on fundamental
value. This would address the dangerous disconnect from fundamentals
bemoaned by Robert Shiller:
We have seen that the market is not well anchored by
fundamentals. People do not even know to any degree of
accuracy what the "right" level of the market is: not many
of them spend much time thinking about what its level
should be or whether it is over- or underpriced today.
153
C. The Positive Effects of the Price-Fraud Theory Arguably
Outweigh Any Negative Effects
Although recognition of the price-fraud theory of liability would help
prevent the growth of asset bubbles, the proposal could have some negative
effects. First, by pricing to fundamentals during an asset bubble, issuers
and underwriters might exacerbate the perceived underpricing
phenomenon.1 54 Issuers and underwriters would leave even more money on
the table to be scooped up as profits in the secondary market, arguably to a
less beneficial use.155 This concern does not outweigh the benefits of
adopting the proposal, however. The potential impacts of asset bubbles are
so devastating that a means of preventing their growth is far more beneficial
to the economy than leaving less money on the table during an IPO.1
56
of the public to over- and underpricing errors when they occur").
1
52 See Leonard, supra note 42 (quoting University of Oregon economist Mark Thoma) ("If
the price were marked to fundamentals instead, then the value of the asset wouldn't follow the
market up, and that would have a stabilizing effect relative to the mark-to-market approach.").
153SHILLER, supra note 16, at 147; see also Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra
note 22, at 249 (remarks of Hon. Bill Thomas, Vice Chairman) (urging Warren Buffett to "speak
out even more than you have about fundamentals").
154See supra Part II.E.
155See supra Part II.E.
1
56See supra Part II.B.
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Moreover, the signal sent by the below-market offering price would help
prevent the price from skyrocketing in first-day trading, counterbalancing
the effect of the lower offering price on first-day returns.'
57
Second, by forcing the issuer and underwriter to internalize the effects
of knowing overpricing, the price-fraud theory of liability could increase
the cost of raising capital. Rather than merely relying on market forces
when setting prices, the issuer and underwriter would have to expend
resources to assess the fundamental value of the securities. This concern is
allayed because, first, society is better off if someone performs a
fundamental analysis of securities when they are issued, and second, the
issuer and underwriter can accomplish this analysis more efficiently than
any other market participant.1 58 The issuer and underwriter have access to
the fundamentals and, often, have already performed an intrinsic valuation
of the securities during the book-building process. 
159
Third, by affording a cause of action to investors who purchase
fraudulently overpriced securities, the price-fraud theory risks being viewed
as an insurance policy for investors, who themselves will lose the incentive
to research their investment decisions. This could deprive the market of the
benefits of informed participants and run contrary to the purpose of the
securities acts.' 60 This concern is allayed by the fact that recovery would
only be available in instances where an investor could prove that the
overpricing was fraudulent-i.e., with scienter. Therefore, a rational
investor would nonetheless have the incentive to research a security before
purchasing it. Moreover, most investors are not currently performing
fundamental analysis of securities before purchasing them,' 61 rendering the
potential loss of an incentive to do this analysis less impactful.
Finally, to the extent that the price-fraud theory were successful in
preventing market bubbles by anchoring prices in fundamentals, the
157 See supra Part II.E.
158 See supra Part II.E.
159 See supra Part II.E. 1.
16°Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) ("But the statutes make these latter
[private securities] actions available, not to provide investors with broad insurance against market
losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.").
16 1 See Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular Models, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 55, 63
(1990) (presenting the results of a survey conducted of IPO investors, wealthy individuals, and
institutional investors about the underpricing of IPOs) ("Only 26 percent of the IPO investor
sample said they had done any calculations of what true fundamental value of a share in the
company was, and compared the price of a share with this value.").
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beneficial impacts of bubbles would be lost. Bubbles cause a temporary
over-allocation of resources, which can propel innovation. 162  This pro-
bubble argument loses steam, however, when one examines the devastating
impacts of the MBS bubble on the economy.
163
IV. PRICE FRAUD Is ARGUABLY A VIABLE LEGAL THEORY UNDER
SECURITIES FRAUD JURISPRUDENCE
The theory of price fraud imposes securities fraud liability on issuers
and underwriters who knowingly issue securities at a price that is not
rationally related to the securities' fundamental value. Academics in non-
legal disciplines have previously proposed or assumed that this liability
exists. For example, Patricia J. Hughes, a professor of management, argued
that, to avoid the market failure caused by the information asymmetry
between issuers and investors, issuers should be required to disclose firm
value at the time of issue and should face penalties for fraudulent
disclosure.164  Similarly, other scholars have assumed-for purposes of
162See SHILLER, supra note 16, at 229-30 ("Speculative markets perform critical resource-
allocation functions .... and any interference with markets to tame bubbles interferes with these
functions as well."); Ljungqvist et al., supra note 129, at 1694 ("While our model does not
specifically address social welfare, the possible expropriation of sentiment investors does give rise
to some policy issues. To the extent that such expropriation subsidizes risk taking by young firms,
social welfare may be enhanced.... Do the exuberant provide subsidy to the socially
productive--or are they merely lunch for the avaricious?"); Stout, supra note 28, at 666 ("But if a
firm does raise bargain-basement capital by selling inefficiently overpriced stock, those excess
funds are unlikely to be wasted in unproductive projects."); Michael Lewis, In Defense of the
Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at E44, reprinted in PANIC: THE STORY OF MODERN
FINANCIAL INSANITY, supra note 72, at 239, 252 ("[I]f speculators drive up the price of tech
stocks to ridiculous heights, a result is vast numbers of young people with technical training and a
lust for entrepreneurship, a higher social status for the entrepreneur and, uncoincidentally, many
interesting business ideas that are at the moment ahead of their time but one day may well be right
of it. A result is also, in this case, hundreds of thousands of miles of surplus optical fiber, which is
a bit wasteful-we don't need it yet-but not a total waste: we will need it one day soon.
Another result, finally, is a lot of formerly sleepy big companies that had the living hell scared out
of them by upstarts-and scrambled to make themselves more efficient. Say what you will about
the boom: it kept people on their toes.").
163 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
164Patricia J. Hughes, Signalling by Direct Disclosure Under Asymmetric Information, 8 J.
ACC. & ECON. 119, 119 (1986) ("In this paper, an informational asymmetry exists between
investors and the issuer of an initial public offering about the value of the security. To avoid
market failure, a solution is proposed in which the issuer makes a disclosure about firm value that
is verified by an investment banker. The investment banker enters into a contingent contract with
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modeling the effects of litigation costs on the pricing of IPOs-that post-
offering price drops will trigger securities fraud litigation165 and liability. 66
This article is the first to argue, however, that price fraud is a viable
theory under current securities fraud jurisprudence. As explained below,
each element of securities fraud is arguably satisfied when an issuer or
underwriter knowingly sets an offering price at a level that is not rationally
related to the security's intrinsic value.
A. The Issuer and Underwriter Make an Implicit Representation that
the Offering Price Is Rationally Related to Fundamental Value
The essence of securities fraud is a misrepresentation. 167  Investors
cannot premise a securities fraud claim on a bad deal unless they can
identify a fraudulent statement or omission that precipitated the bad deal.1
68
This misrepresentation element is the key sticking point in imposing
liability on issuers and underwriters for setting an offering price above
fundamental value. As this element is currently applied, investors cannot
sue the issuer and underwriter for securities fraud merely because they
purchased overpriced stock in an IPO or an overpriced MBS, even if the
issuer and underwriter knew that the price was inflated due to a bubble.
Indeed, this article's author identified only one case in which securities
investors attempted to premise liability on overpricing, and the court
summarily rejected the attempt. 1
69
investors which imposes a penalty if the ex post observable cash flow indicates fraudulent
disclosure.").
1
6 5 See Patricia J. Hughes & Anjan V. Thakor, Litigation Risk, Intermediation, and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 709, 719 (1992) ("To model the
litigation game in a simple and realistic way, we assume that a lawsuit will be undertaken if
investors and the courts infer ex post that there is a 'sufficiently' high probability that the IPO was
overpriced."').
'66 See Douglas A. Hensler, Litigation Costs and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings,
16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 111, 114 (1995) (examining an issuer's motivation to
underprice an IPO of equity to limit litigation risk and assuming for the purpose of the model that,
if the stock price falls below an arbitrary trigger price, the court will find in favor of the investors
in a subsequent lawsuit).
1
67See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)
(listing the first element of a securities fraud claims as "a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant").
168 See id.
169See Rhodes v. Omega Research, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding
that allegations regarding "'price of the offering' are baseless, are not actionable under sections 11
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Rather, investors must identify a fraudulent misrepresentation or
omission in the offering documents that inflated the offering price. For
example, in In re TyCom Ltd. Securities Litigation, purchasers of stock in
TyCom Ltd.'s IPO alleged that they were induced to purchase the TyCom
stock at an inflated price by misrepresentations in the prospectus about the
demand for undersea fiber-optic-cable bandwidth.1 70 Similarly, in Central
Laborers' Pension Fund v. SIR VA, Inc., purchasers of SIRVA common
stock pursuant to an IPO alleged that the prospectus made false statements
or omissions about the health of SIRVA Europe, SIRVA's insurance
reserves, and SIRVA's earning projections and accounting practices.1 71
This article overcomes this obstacle to securities fraud liability by
showing that, by setting a security's offering price, the issuer and
underwriter make an implicit representation that the price is reasonably
related to the security's intrinsic value. This implicit representation, if
knowingly false at the time of issue, could form the basis for a securities
fraud claim against the issuer and underwriter. Therefore, under the price-
fraud theory, an investor who purchased overpriced stock in an IPO or an
overpriced MBS could hold the issuer and underwriter liable for securities
fraud if they knew that the offering price was not reasonably related to the
security's intrinsic value, as long as the other elements of securities fraud
were satisfied. 1
72
In particular, this article shows that implicit representations are
recognized in securities fraud cases when there is an information imbalance
and the implicit representation is reasonably understood. Both of these
components are present in the setting of a security's offering price. First,
issuers and underwriters possess superior information to that of investors. 173
or 12(a)(2), fall well within the bespeaks caution doctrine, and shall be dismissed with
prejudice"); see also In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) (not
reaching the issue of overpricing because "the shareholders never specifically designate the
VeriFone IPO price as an actionable misrepresentation in their Amended Complaint").
"'No. 03-CV-1352-PB, 2005 WL 2127674, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept. 2,2005).
171No. 04-C-7644, 2006 WL 2787520, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2006) (purchaser of
SIRVA common stock pursuant to the IPO alleged that the prospectus made false statements or
omissions about the health of SIRVA Europe, SIRVA's insurance reserves, and SIRVA's earning
projections and accounting practices).
1
72
Of course, the other elements of securities fraud-falsity, scienter, materiality, reliance,
and loss causation-must also be met. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157. These elements are
analyzed below in Part IV.B.




Second, investors intuitively understand that the offering price of a security
should be rationally related to the security's fundamental value. 174  This
intuition is supported by research in the fields of marketing and economics
that demonstrates that purchasers interpret prices as a signal about
fundamental characteristics. 175  Moreover, the relationship between an
increase in offering price and higher first-day returns is consistent with
investors' interpreting offering price as a signal of fundamental value.1
76
1. Implicit Representations Are Recognized in Securities Fraud
Cases when There Is an Information Imbalance and the
Implicit Representation Is Reasonably Understood
Securities fraud liability can be premised on fraudulent implicit
representations, as well as fraudulent explicit representations. The most
frequently recognized implicit representations in securities fraud cases are
those underlying predictions and opinions expressed by officers and
directors.177 Neither a prediction nor an opinion is itself actionable merely
because it turns out to be inaccurate. 178  Underlying a prediction or an
opinion, however, is an implicit representation that the prediction or
opinion has a reasonable basis.179 If, at the time that a prediction or opinion
is expressed, it lacks a reasonable basis, this false implicit representation is
actionable as securities fraud, assuming the other elements of fraud are
satisfied.18 0  For example, a top corporate official's statement that he was
'
74
See infra Part IV.A.3.a.
175 See infra Part IV.A.3.a.
1
76 
See infra Part IV.A.3.c.
177 See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1428 (3d Cir. 1997) ("As
explained by the Court in Virginia Bankshares, statements of opinion by corporate officials can be
materially significant to investors because investors know that these top officials have knowledge
and expertise far exceeding that of the ordinary investor.").
1
7 8
See Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that in
order "[t]o state a claim for securities fraud .., a plaintiff must allege that the defendant
knowingly or recklessly made a false or misleading statement of material fact in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, upon which plaintiff reasonably relied, proximately causing his
injury" (footnote omitted)).
179
See id. at 1277 ("Accordingly, projections and statements of optimism are false and
misleading for the purposes of the securities laws if they were issued without good faith or lacked
a reasonable basis when made.").
18°See Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Most often,
whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive statement was 'false' when it was
made. The answer to this inquiry, however, does not tam on whether the prediction in fact proved
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"comfortable" with analysts' projections of earning was actionable if it was
not made with a reasonable basis.'81
These implicit representations are recognized when two elements are
present: (1) an information imbalance exists between the speaker and the
audience; and (2) the implicit representation is reasonably understood by
the audience. 82 For example, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the
seminal case about implicit representations, the Supreme Court held that a
board of directors' statements that a proposed buy-out price for minority
shareholders' stock was "high" and that the merger's terms were "fair"
were actionable to the extent they did not rest on a factual basis justifying
them as accurate. 83  The Court recognized that "directors usually have
knowledge and expertness far exceeding the normal investor's resources"
and that "such conclusory terms in a commercial context are reasonably
understood to rest on a factual basis."'184 Similarly, in Marx v. Computer
Sciences Corp., the Ninth Circuit recognized that, implicit within an
executive's forecast of a net income of approximately $1.00 per share, was
a representation that this was the company's "informed and reasonable
belief' on the date of the statement.1 85 This implicit representation would
be untrue if the company "did not then believe earnings would be in that
amount," "knew that there was reason to believe they would not be," or did
not premise the forecast on "a reasonable method of preparation and a valid
to be wrong; instead, falsity is determined by examining the nature of the prediction-with the
emphasis on whether the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was made in good
faith, or had a sound factual or historical basis."); Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts'
Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information:
Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1126 (1987) ("[T]he only truly factual
elements involved in a projection are the implicit representations that the statements are made in
good faith and with a reasonable basis.").
181 See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1428-29; see also Roots P'ship v. Lands'
End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1417 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Although defendants' alleged statements were
contingent by their very nature, a reasonable investor could have taken them to imply that
defendants' had a reasonable basis for stating that Lands' End's earnings goal was attainable in
fiscal 1990.").
182 See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091, 1093 (1991).
"'.1d. at 1091, 1093.
1841d.; see also In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1428 ("As explained by the Court
in Virginia Bankshares, statements of opinion by corporate officials can be materially significant
to investors because investors know that these top officials have knowledge and expertise far
exceeding that of the ordinary investor.").
'85See 507 F.2d 485,490 (9th Cir. 1974).
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basis." 186  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted "the disparity
between the parties in access to the information necessary to judge the
accuracy of the forecast" and that this is "what a reasonable investor would
take the statement to mean."' 87 As a further example, in Wharf (Holdings)
Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized
that the sale of an option carries with it an implicit representation of the
seller's intention to permit the option's exercise. 188 The seller's intention
not to perform was secret, and thus this information was not available to the
buyer, and the implicit representation was reasonably understood "because
a buyer normally presumes good faith."'189
2. When the Issuer and Underwriter Set a Security's Offering
Price, There Is an Information Imbalance
Although issuers and underwriters must comply with detailed disclosure
obligations when offering securities, those obligations do not require the
disclosure of every piece of inside information about the company.' 90
186 1d
1871id
8 See 532 U.S. 588, 596 (2001) ("But even were it the case that the Act covers only
misrepresentations likely to affect the value of securities, Wharf's secret reservation was such a
misrepresentation.").
1891d.
19°See Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1190 (1 lth Cir. 2002) ("Oxford
first argues that issuers have a duty to disclose, in the prospectus, all information material to the
offering. We disagree."); Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1999)
("Although in the context of a public offering there is a strong affirmative duty of disclosure, it is
clear that an issuer of securities owes no absolute duty to disclose all material information."); 17
J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER THE 1933 ACT
§ 4.66 (2002 & Supp. 2010) ("Furthermore, not all material forward-looking information in the
issuer's possession at the time its registered offering commences is required to be disclosed in a
registration statement."); Thomas Gilroy & Mary Elizabeth Pratt, Preparing the Management's
Discussion and Analysis, 874 PRACTISING L. INST.: CORP. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 199,
239 (1995) (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)) ("The MD&A is not a general
requirement for disclosure of all material information regarding a registrant, though it obviously
calls for a very broad review since virtually any material business or financial development can
have a material impact on the registrant's prospective liquidity, capital resources or operating
results. There is no general requirement in the federal securities laws for a registrant to disclose
all material information."); Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to
Disclose Under Rule lob-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1677 (2004) ("[W]here the SEC has
addressed a subject by setting affirmative disclosure rules, the presumption should be that the
antifraud rules require nothing else. Thus, the scope of disclosure in a public offering should be
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Indeed, there is an imbalance between the information available to the
issuer and the underwriter, on the one hand, and the information available
to the investors, on the other hand.
This information imbalance is roundly recognized in the context of
IPOs. As explained by legal scholars John Coffee and Hillary Sale:
"[C]orporate managers who have non-public access to material information
about the firm's future cash flows may be more likely to issue equity
securities when they perceive the firm to be overvalued by the market than
when they perceive it to be undervalued."'' 91 Similarly, economists, when
creating models about IPO pricing, assume the presence of this
asymmetry. 1
92
Indeed, in recognition of this informational asymmetry, investors
interpret various corporate decisions during a securities issue as signals
about inside information. 93 For example, research indicates that investors
interpret a firm's decision to issue equity as a signal that insiders believe the
what the instructions of the relevant form require."); but see Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising
Capital Directly From Investors: What Disclosure Does Rule J0b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111,
126-27 (2002) (arguing that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act imposes broader
disclosure duties on issuers than encompassed within the SEC's affirmative disclosure rules).
191 COFFEE ET AL., supra note 115, at 76.
192See Kim & Ritter, supra note 115, at 413 ("It is often assumed that insiders of IPOs have
better information about the expected value of their projects than outside investors do."); Stewart
C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 1396, 1984) ("We assume the firm (i.e., its managers) has information that investors do not
have, and that both managers and investors realize this. We take this information asymmetry as
given-a fact of life.").
193See Ritter & Welch, supra note 85, at 1821 ("It is not surprising that firms are eager to
look good when they conduct their IPO, and that the market has difficulties in disentangling
carefully hidden warning signals.").
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firm is overvalued by the market 94 and that investors interpret the choice of
a reputable underwriter as a signal of a high-quality issue.'95
This informational asymmetry has also been widely recognized in the
wake of the recent MBS debacle, where MBS investors purchased securities
with insufficient information about the default risks of the underlying
mortgages. 96 This information imbalance has been discussed in SEC staff
reports, 197  congressional hearings, 198  and scholarly publications. 99
194 COFFEE ET AL., supra note 115, at 76-77 ("Aware of this incentive [to issue equity when
the market overvalues the firm], investors may reduce the firm's value upon the announcement of
a common stock issue, viewing the announcement as a signal of overvaluation."); Bruce
Greenwald et al., Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic
Fluctuations, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 194, 195 (1984) ("Greater reliance on debt by good firms means
that equity will predominantly be sold by inferior ones. Thus, attempting to sell equity may
convey a strong negative signal about a firm's quality and reduce its market value accordingly."
(citation omitted)); Myers & Majluf, supra note 192, at 4 ("[I]nvestors, aware of their relative
ignorance, will reason that a decision not to issue shares signals 'good news.' The news conveyed
by an issue is bad or at least less good.").
195 Lily Hua Fang, Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting
Services, 60 J. FINANCE 2729, 2731 (2005) ("Overall, the findings suggest that banks'
underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns, and thus are informative of issue quality.
Investors infer a positive signal when a reputable underwriter agrees to put his name on the line,
and ceteris paribus, the market clears at a higher price for the issuer.").
1
96 See SHILLER, supra note 70, at 135 (2008) ("Those who bought residential-mortgage-
backed securities based on subprime mortgages typically did so with little more information than
that contained in the ratings given them by rating agencies. And while the rating agencies
themselves release additional information, the ratings are the only easily interpreted and compared
pieces of information, and even these are released only with caveats.").
1
97See SEC ET AL., supra note 106, at 40 (recognizing that "MBS issuers and originators
might not reveal all the information in their possession about the MBS").
'
98 See Credibility of Credit Ratings: Hearing, supra note 22, at 503-04 (statement of Mark
Froeba, Former Senior Vice President, U.S. Derivatives, Moody's Investors Service) (testifying
about the information imbalance between investment banks and ratings analysts) ("[T]here were
often times when things were hidden, concealed, misrepresented."); Subprime Lending and
Securitization: Hearing, supra note 53, at 210-11 (statement of Patricia Lindsay, Former Vice
President, Corporate Risk, New Century Financial Corporation) (describing the buyers of
securitized subprime mortgages as "unsophisticated" because "they didn't know the risk of the
underlying product").
19See, e.g., KRUGMAN, supra note 4, at 149 ("[T]he lenders didn't concern themselves with
the quality of their loans because they didn't hold on to them. Instead, they sold them to investors,
who didn't understand what they were buying."); POSNER, supra note 2, at 59 ("Banks that
packaged and sold mortgage-backed securities had little incentive to make careful estimates of the
riskiness of the mortgages that backed the securities, because sale shifted the risk of default to the
purchasers of the securities. Prospective purchasers had an incentive to assess that risk, of course,
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Economists Steven Drucker and Christopher Mayer explain this imbalance
in more detail:
Underwriters either own or work quite closely with
mortgage originators and servicers in the pools that they
represent and thus possess non-public information about
the quality of the collateral underlying the securitization
and sometimes about the pool's subsequent performance.
For example, originators have access to detailed
information about the borrower that is not typically
disclosed to investors, such as the number of points paid at
origination and the payment-to-income ratio of the
borrower.200
Based on this information imbalance, Drucker and Mayer studied
underwriters' investment behavior in the secondary market with respect to
MBS that they brought to market, concluding that "underwriters appear to
exploit access to better information and models to their own advantage. 20'
3. When the Issuer and Underwriter Set a Security's Offering
Price, Investors Reasonably Understand that the Price Is
Rationally Related to Fundamental Value
At the heart of the price-fraud theory is the assertion that investors
reasonably understand that a security's offering price is rationally related to
fundamental value. Without this, there is no implicit representation on
which to premise a securities fraud claim. This article, drawing from
investors' intuitive understanding of offering prices and from marketing and
but they had less information than the originators."); Bethel et al., supra note 8, at 18 ("Linked to
these investigations are allegations that some MBS sponsors may have ignored or withheld
information about the credit risks of the mortgage pools and may have even pressured due-
diligence firms to overlook credit issues on loans.").
2 0Drucker & Mayer, supra note 108, at 1-2.
20 1 See id. abstract, 2 ("While underwriters bid on the vast majority of their own tranches, the
17% of tranches that they avoid bidding on exhibit much worse-than-average ex-post
performance. When an underwriter declines to submit a bid at a secondary market sale, 30-day
delinquent loans are up to four times more likely to be reported as missing their next payment
compared to securities in which the underwriter bids.... When underwriters bid on securities, the
underlying mortgage pools have higher payoff rates in the four months after the auction,
indicating that such pools are more likely to be valuable. Instead of acting as unbiased market




economics research, argues that investors do reasonably interpret a
security's offering price as a signal of the firm's fundamental value.
a. Intuitively, a Security 's Offering Price Is Rationally
Related to Fundamental Value
The idea that a security's offering price rationally relates to fundamental
value has intuitive appeal. Indeed, in Glassman v. Computervision Corp.,
the First Circuit recognized that a security's offering price is a
representation about the firm's fundamental value: "The price set for an
offering of securities is essentially a forecast. Price can be characterized as
a present value calculation of the firm's future streams of earnings or
dividends."2 °2
This intuitive relationship between offering price and fundamental value
has also been noted by underwriters, the SEC, and investors. In 1963, after
conducting a comprehensive study of the securities markets, the SEC
reported that some underwriters feel that overpricing is inappropriate during
a speculative boom: "Some underwriters suggested that it would have been
improper to try to get as much as the market would bear, where such a price
was not justified by any of the usual yardsticks of value. 20 3 Similarly, in
the context of attempting to prevent perceived under-pricing of IPOs, the
SEC acknowledged an underwriter's duty to price to fundamentals:
[T]he underwriter must exercise care to assure that the
price reflects what he and the issuer reasonably believe,
after the underwriter's due diligence investigation, to be the
value of the securities giving weight to, among other
factors, such fundamentals as the business, operations, and
prospects of the issuer and the nature and financial
condition of the issuer.
204
20290 F.3d 617, 626 (1st Cir. 1996); but see Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 776 F. Supp. 1044,
1052 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("In an initial public offering it cannot be assumed price reflects value
because there is simply no open and developed market. Instead, interested parties have set the
price.").
2 0 3 
See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. NO. 88-95, pt. 1, at 501 (1963).
204
SEC, HOT ISSUES, S.E.C. RELEASE NO. 5274, at 4 (1972).
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Finally, a survey of IPO investors conducted by Robert Shiller found
that "there appears to be an idea that underwriters should charge 'fair'
prices for issues, even when they could obtain a lot more. 2 °5
This intuitive connection between price and fundamental value also
exists beyond the securities markets. In a groundbreaking 1944 article,
economist Tibor Scitovsky noted the connection between price and product
quality: "Another important index of quality is price. Economists are wont
to minimize the importance of this factor, fearing the havoc it may wreak
with the whole theory of choice. But 'mass observation' of one's friends





The intuitive relationship between price and fundamental characteristics
is reflected in the common usage of words about price to convey
information about fundamental value.20 7  Words like cheap, low-budget,
and low-rent are used to convey negative information about quality.
208
Similarly, words like expensive, top-dollar, and top-shelf are used to
convey positive information about quality.20 9 By the same token, in the
securities markets, so-called "penny stocks" and other lower-priced
offerings are interpreted as of lower quality.21°
This connection between price and fundamental characteristics, such as
value of a security or quality of a good, is intuitive because it is logical.
211
20 5Shiller, supra note 161, at 62 (presenting the results of a survey conducted of IPO
investors, wealthy individuals, and institutional investors about the underpricing of IPOs).
206Tibor Scitovsky, Some Consequences of the Habit of Judging Quality by Price, 12 REv.
EcoN. STUD. 100, 100 (1944-45).
20
7 See id.
208See id. ("The word 'cheap' usually means inferior quality nowadays ... .
209See id. ("[In the United States 'expensive' is in the process of losing its original meaning
and becoming a synonym for superior quality."); Arthur G. Bedeian, Consumer Perception of
Price as an Indicator of Product Quality, MICH. ST. U. Bus. TOPics, Summer 1971, at 60
("Today, more than ever, the word expensive has come to connote quality in the mind of the
consumer.").
2 10See Fernando et al., supra note 131, at 9 ("It is also possible that institutions may avoid
investing in low-priced stocks, since these may be viewed negatively as 'penny stocks."'); accord
Allen, supra note 108, at 346-47 ("[M]anagers with significant institutional customers often
desire to price an IPO at between $13.00 and $20.00 per share because a bias exists among some
sophisticated investors against lower-priced offerings, which sometimes are viewed as being
associated with lesser quality companies.").
211 See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 60 ("The perception of price as an indicator of product
quality is basically rational. It indicates a trust in the forces of supply and demand and is based on
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A logical person reads behind a price to the underlying supply and demand
curves, interpreting a higher price as indicative of a security that merits
higher demand because of its higher fundamental value or a good that
merits higher demand because of its higher quality.212 As Scitovsky
explained, interpreting price as a signal of quality "merely implies a belief
that price is determined by the competitive interplay of the rational forces of
supply and demand., 213 These very same forces underlie the setting of a
security's offering price.
Purchasers' logical interpretation of price as a signal of fundamental
characteristics turns conventional demand theory on its head.214 Under
conventional demand theory, a demand curve is negatively sloped because,
the higher the price, the lower the demand.2 15 When purchasers interpret
price as a signal of fundamental characteristics, however, a demand curve
may be positively sloped: the higher the price, the higher the demand.2 16
the assumption that prevailing market prices exist because they were found to be fair and
reasonable."); Eitan Gerstner, Do Higher Prices Signal Higher Quality?, 22 J. MARKETING RES.
209, 209 (1985) ("In a perfectly functioning market, one might expect a strong, positive
relationship between product quality and price.").
212 See Kyle Bagwell & Michael H. Riordan, High and Declining Prices Signal Product
Quality, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 224, 224-25 (1991) ("The most efficient way for the firm to signal
high quality is to charge a price too high to be profitable if the product were in fact of lower
quality. This high-price strategy is potentially successful for two reasons. First, the consequent
loss of sales volume is less damaging to a higher-cost product. Second, a lower-quality product
would lose more sales from informed consumers by charging a high price. Understanding this,
uninformed consumers rationally infer higher quality from the higher price."); Gerstner, supra
note 211, at 209 ("Price can convey demand-related quality information or supply-related quality
information. A high price may reflect either a high demand for superior quality or the high
production costs associated with high quality.").
213 Scitovsky, supra note 206, at 100; see Kent B. Monroe & R. Krishnan, The Effect of Price
on Subjective Product Evaluations, in PERCEIVED QUALITY: How CONSUMERS VIEW STORES
AND MERCHANDISE 209, 210 (Jacob Jacoby & Jerry C. Olson eds., 1985) (citing Scitovsky, supra
note 206, at 100); Akshay R. Rao & Kent B. Monroe, The Effect of Price, Brand Name, and Store
Name on Buyers 'Perceptions of Product Quality: An Integrative Review, 26 J. MARKETING RES.
351, 351 (1989) (citing Scitovsky, supra note 206, at 100).
214 See Monroe & Krishnan, supra note 213, at 209-10.
215 See Harold J. Leavitt, A Note on Some Experimental Findings About the Meanings of
Price, 27 J. BUS. 205, 205 (1954) ("Conventional price analysis takes the generalized view that
demand curves are negatively sloped. The purchase of a product is expected to decline as its price
increases and to increase as its price declines-other factors being equal.").
1See id. at 210 ("These findings suggest that demand curves may not invariably be
negatively sloped, that price itself may have more than one meaning to a consumer, and that a
higher price may sometimes increase, rather than decrease, his readiness to buy.").
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The phenomenon of a price's dual impact on demand has been widely noted
by economists, behavioral scientists, and marketing researchers. 217  As
explained by economist Joseph E. Stiglitz, "[O]ne can think of the change
in the price as having two effects: a movement along a fixed-information
demand curve, and a shift in the demand curve from the change in
information (beliefs). 218
b. Research Supports the Conclusion that Investors Interpret
a Security's Offering Price as a Signal of Fundamental
Value
In the field of marketing, compelling research shows that consumers
interpret product price as a signal of quality when consumers possess
incomplete information. 21 9  Similarly, economists theorize that investors
interpret market clearing prices as signals of underlying data about the
securities' fundamental value.220  These fields of research support the
intuitive recognition that a security's offering price is a signal of the
security's fundamental value.22' Moreover, the demonstrated relationship
between an increase in offering price and higher first-day returns is
217See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 64 ("[Tlhe traditional demand curve may not invariably be
negatively shaped. Price has come to have at least two meanings to the consumer: (1) as a
measure of cost, and (2) as an indicator of quality."); Leavitt, supra note 215, at 210 ("These
findings suggest that demand curves may not invariably be negatively sloped, that price itself may
have more than one meaning to a consumer, and that a higher price may sometimes increase,
rather than decrease, his readiness to buy.... One might guess that a high price may be an
attracting instead of a repelling force for particular brands of many different kinds of items.");
Monroe & Krishnan, supra note 213, at 209 ("[B]ehavioral-science researchers have shown that
evaluation and choice are related and involve two separate mental processes. Further, it has been
shown that price can affect the evaluation as well as the choice of a product."); Sanford J.
Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
246, 249 (1976) ("[A]n increase in price may actually increase demand; the presumption for a
downward sloping demand curve is much weaker when individuals judge quality by price.").
218Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price,
25 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 3 (1987) ("[D]emand curves, may under quite plausible conditions,
not be downward sloping.").
219 See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 59; Monroe & Krishnan, supra note 213, at 210 ("If
buyers do not possess perfect information about product attributes, then they must make some
inferences from the information cues available, one of which is price. Thus, price might be used
as an indicator of the qualities inherent in the product, and, if so, a higher price might lead to the
perception of higher product quality.").
220See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 60
221See infra Part IV.A.3.b.iii.
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consistent with investors' interpreting offering price as a signal of
fundamental value.222
i. Marketing Research Shows that Consumers Interpret
Product Price as a Signal of Quality when There Is
Asymmetric Information
Marketing researchers have focused much attention on consumers'
223perceptions of price as a signal of a product's fundamental quality. In
general, the data shows that consumers interpret a product's price as
indicative of quality.224 In other words, consumers generally believe that
"you get what you pay for." 225 Companies, aware of this signaling role of
prices, sometimes use the high price of a particular good as an advertising
226slogan. For example, according to marketing professor Benson P.
22 2 S e i
See infra Part IV.A.3.c.
223 See Monroe & Krishnan, supra note 213, at 209 ("Of the several types of product
evaluations that have been investigated in the past, price effects on the perception of product
quality have been one of the most frequently examined.... [Blehavioral-science researchers have
shown that evaluation and choice are related and involve two separate mental processes. Further,
it has been shown that price can affect the evaluation as well as the choice of a product.").
224 See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 63 ("In making any culminating comments concerning the
findings of these five briefed studies, it seems clear that there is one point upon which they all
agree: price often seems to be perceived as an indicator of product quality by the consumer.");
Monroe & Krishnan, supra note 213, at 222 (summarizing studies to date) ("Some studies have
considered situations when the only differential information available was price. Generally, these
single-cue studies have found a positive and statistically significant price-perceived-quality
relationship. However, other studies have varied other cues in addition to price, including actual
product samples, promotional, store, and brand information. Although the multicue studies have
found a positive price-perceived-quality relationship, generally, such a relationship was not
statistically significant."); Rao & Monroe, supra note 213, at 355 (performing study and reporting
results) ("[T]he price effect on perceived quality for consumer products is moderately large and
statistically significant."); Raymond C. Stokes, The Effects of Price, Package Design, and Brand
Familiarity on Perceived Quality, in PERCEIVED QUALITY: How CONSUMERS VIEW STORES AND
MERCHANDISE, supra note 213, at 233, 243 (summarizing results of study involving rice) ("Based
upon most of the research on price-quality-perception, it was expected that the price main effect
would be significant on the quality-rating dependent variable. The confirmation of this
expectation lends some additional support for a generalized price-quality-perception
hypothesis.").
225 Gerstner, supra note 211, at 209 (reviewing prior studies and reporting that "consumers
indeed believe that high prices are indicators of better quality, a belief that 'you get what you pay
for'").
226See, e.g., Scitovsky, supra note 206, at 100 ("Worse still, one of the largest American
breweries uses the advertising slogan: 'Michelob, America's highest-priced beer!"').
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Shapiro, Johnnie Walker Black used the following slogan in 1967: "At
$9.40 it's expensive. '227
And yet, despite general acceptance of the signaling effect of product
price, the strength of the price signal is not uniform.228 Rather, further
marketing research shows that a product's price has the strongest signaling
effect when there is a perceived quality difference among various products
and there is an information imbalance between the manufacturer and the
consumer.
229
The presence of a stronger price signaling effect in goods with
perceived quality differences is logical. 30 If a consumer does not believe
that two different brands of a particular good differ in fundamental
characteristics, a difference in their prices is unlikely to convince the
consumer otherwise. 231  As explained by marketing scholars Robert A.
227Benson P. Shapiro, The Psychology of Pricing, 46 HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1968, at
14, 25 ("Differences in the taste of scotch are not perceived by most people. The price, usually in
the $6-$10 range, is large enough to bring the expended effort concept into play.... [T]he price
of scotch is an effective indicator of quality for many consumers. It is interesting to note that in
1967 the Christmas advertisements for Johnnie Walker Black emphasized that 'At $9.40 it's
expensive."').
228 See William B. Dodds et al., Effects of Price, Brand, and Store Information on Buyers'
Product Evaluations, 28 J. MARKETING RES. 307, 316 (1991) (conducting study and reporting
results) ("Overall, when price was the only extrinsic cue available, the subjects clearly perceived
quality to be related positively to price. When other extrinsic information was present, the results
were less persuasive."); Donald R. Lichtenstein & Scot Burton, The Relationship Between
Perceived and Objective Price-Quality, 26 J. MARKETING RES. 429, 429 (1989) (reviewing prior
research) ("Extant research evidence suggests that though the use of price as an indicator of
product quality is widespread, the impact of price varies significantly across individuals and
products being judged." (citations omitted)).
229 See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 64.
230See id. at 64 (reviewing previous studies and concluding that goods with large consumer-
perceived quality differences are more likely to possess positively sloped demand curves); Zarrel
V. Lambert, Price and Choice Behavior, 9 J. MARKETING RES. 35, 40 (1972) (conducting a study
and the price-perceived quality relationship and concluding that "[g]enerally, persons who chose
the high-priced item perceived large quality variation within the product category and saw the
consequences of a poor choice as being undesirable"); Shapiro, supra note 227, at 25 (referring to
previous studies and concluding that price is more likely to be perceived as a signal of quality if
there are "large, perceived quality differences between competing brands").
231 See Robert A. Peterson & William R. Wilson, Perceived Risk and Price-Reliance Schema
as Price-Perceived-Quality Mediators, in PERCEIVED QUALITY: How CONSUMERS VIEW STORES
AND MERCHANDISE, supra note 213, at 247, 249 ("To the extent product-quality variation is low




Peterson and William R. Wilson: "Obviously, a condition that is
indispensable for obtaining the price-perceived-quality effect in an
experiment is that subjects perceive the products within the class being
investigated to vary in quality. 232 Therefore, items with perceived quality
differences, like wine and perfume, have stronger price signaling,233 while
items without perceived quality differences, like sandwich bags, have
weaker price signaling.234
Similarly, it makes sense that the price signaling effect would be
stronger in circumstances where the consumer does not possess the
requisite information to make a direct assessment of quality.235 Marketing
scholars Kent B. Monroe and R. Krishnan explain:
If buyers do not possess perfect information about product
attributes, then they must make some inferences from the
information cues available, one of which is price. Thus,
price might be used as an indicator of the qualities inherent
in the product, and, if so, a higher price might lead to the
perception of higher product quality.236
Indeed, numerous marketing researchers have noted that purchasers are
more likely to interpret price as a signal of quality when they are unable to
make a direct assessment of the product's quality, usually because of an
information imbalance.237
2321id.
233See id at 250 (reporting the results of a survey) (noting that the price-perceived-quality
effect was present for "wine and perfume-two products that are commonly thought to have
substantial variations in quality and whose quality is difficult to evaluate objectively").
234 Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End
Model and Synthesis of Evidence, J. MARKETING, July 1988, at 2, 12 (reviewing prior studies)
("[I]n categories where little variation is expected among brands (such as salt or paper sandwich
bags), price may function only as an indication of sacrifice whereas in categories where quality
variation is expected (such as canned seafood or washing machines), price may function also as an
indication of quality.").
235 See id. at 8 (reviewing prior studies) ("Price... appears to function as a surrogate for
quality when the consumer has inadequate information about intrinsic attributes.").
236See Monroe & Krishnan, supra note 213, at 210.
237 See Bedeian, supra note 209, at 59 ("The modem consumer is faced with the
uncomfortable task of attempting to judge product quality through the use of imperfect knowledge
and with the aid of personal self-perceived quality criteria.... Perhaps a more important measure
of quality as perceived by the consumer is product price."); Lichtenstein & Burton, supra note
228, at 432 (reviewing prior studies) ("There are several possible reasons for this greater reliance
on price as an indicator of quality for durable goods. It may reflect less knowledge about durable
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Notably, several researchers have recognized the potential for marketers
to take advantage of consumers by sending false signals of quality by
setting prices at a level higher than merited by the goods' fundamental
characteristics. 238 This article contends that this same potential for fraud is
present when issuers and underwriters set the offering price of securities.
ii. Economic Theory Supports the Informational Role of
Securities Prices
Economists have identified a similar signaling effect in securities
prices.2 39 Purchasers who lack full information about a particular security
rely on the security's price to convey information about the security's
fundamental value.240  As explained by economist Joseph E. Stiglitz: "In
capital markets, the price at which a security sells may convey information
concerning the expected return of the security (or the likelihood of the
occurrence of various states)., 241 As a consequence of this informational
role of securities prices, a higher price may increase a purchaser's demand
for a security.242  Similarly, as explained by economist Sanford J.
Grossman, a lower price may decrease a purchaser's demand:
goods because the consumer is likely to have made fewer purchases in the average durable goods
category and any purchases are likely to have been made less recently."); Shapiro, supra note
227, at 25 (referring to previous studies and concluding that "products which are difficult to judge
on bases other than price would be most likely to have positively sloped demand curves");
Stokes, supra note 224, at 243 (summarizing results of study involving rice) ("Previous research
has shown that price is used more as a quality cue in situations where uncertainty exists, such as
with unfamiliar brands. This was found to be true in this experiment, supporting results found in
previous research.").
238 See Lichtenstein & Burton, supra note 228, at 430 ("[W]hen the price-perceived quality
and price-objective quality research streams are considered jointly, results suggest that consumers
who rely on price to indicate quality may often be misled."); Gerstner, supra note 211, at 209
("Consumer expectations of higher quality at higher prices can be self-fulfilled only if sellers do
not find it profitable to 'cheat' by conveying false market signals--charging higher prices for
lower quality.").
239See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 218, at 3 ("When the price of some security is higher,
uninformed buyers may infer that the expected return is higher, and their demand may increase."
(citations omitted)).
240See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945)
("Fundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many
people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as
subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan.").
241 Stiglitz, supra note 218, at 32.
242See id. at 3 ("When the price of some security is higher, uninformed buyers may infer that
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A typical consumer goes to work during the day on some
activity that may provide him with no information about a
particular security he owns. Suppose he comes home at the
end of the day to find that the price has fallen. One surely
does not suppose that he then increases his demand for the
security, as if his preferences were unchanged and his
budget constraint has made the holding of the security
cheaper. In fact, he may decide to keep his security
holding unchanged on the basis of the observation that the
price fell because other people had unfavorable information
regarding the security's payoff.
243
In other words, demand curves for securities-as with some consumer
goods-may not always be negatively sloped.2 "
Economists have focused on this signaling effect in the context of the
secondary market.245  Theoretically, when traders with disparate
information enter the market, the clearing price aggregates this information
and conveys it to all.246  Uninformed investors logically interpret this
clearing price as a reflection of the security's fundamental characteristics
and make their investment decisions accordingly.247
the expected return is higher, and their demand may increase." (citations omitted)).
243 Sanford J. Grossman, Rational Expectations and the Informational Role of Prices, in
MODERN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY 128, 129 (Robert J. Barro ed., 1989).
244 
See Stiglitz, supra note 218, at 3 ("[D]emand curves, may under quite plausible conditions,
not be downward sloping. When the price of some security is higher, uninformed buyers may
infer that the expected return is higher, and their demand may increase." (citations omitted)).
245 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 243, at 134 (discussing the effect of price as information
on traders).
24 6
See id at 134 ("[I]f traders come to the market with different information, the price at
which the market clears is itself a very important piece of information to each trader (in that it
reveals the information of other traders)."); Roy Radner, Rational Expectations Equilibrium:
Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices, 47 ECONOMETRICA 655, 655 (1979)
("When traders come to a market with different information about the items to be traded, the
resulting market prices may reveal to some traders something about the information available to
other traders."); Jerry R. Green, Information, Efficiency and Equilibrium 2 (Harvard Inst. of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 284, 1973) ("People who do not engage in information
gathering still can draw inferences about the true state by observing the equilibrium price system
because this is influenced by the signals received by those people who have invested in this
activity.").
24 7See Grossman, supra note 243, at 130 ("It is a fact that the price at which the market clears
conveys information. This means that rational traders will adjust their demand functions to reflect
the fact that if the market clears at a price p, then this price tells them something about how much
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iii. Research Supports the Conclusion that Investors
Interpret Security's Offering Price as a Signal of
Fundamental Value
This marketing research and economic theory support the conclusion
that investors reasonably understand the issuer and underwriter as making
an implicit representation that a security's offering price is rationally related
to the security's fundamental value.248
First, the circumstances in which consumers interpret a product's price
as a signal of fundamental characteristics are present in the sale of
securities. Securities, even more so than wine and perfume, vary in
fundamental characteristics, increasing purchasers' incentives to ferret out
differentiating characteristics. 249 And, just like consumers who are forced
to make a purchase decision without full information, securities purchasers
must make investment choices while at an informational disadvantage with
the issuer and underwriter. 250 Therefore, the very same forces that compel a
consumer to interpret a product's price as a signal of fundamental
characteristics are present when an investor purchases a security in a
primary offering.
This marketing research has been applied beyond the field of consumer
goods in other scenarios in which purchasers must make choices with
incomplete information. For example, finance scholar Lily Hua Fang
applied this research to an underwriter's proffer of its services:
[W]hen quality is unobservable, a premium price arises as a
means of quality assurance because such a price ensures
that the present value of future income is greater than the
short-term profit from cutting quality and selling low
quality goods at high quality prices. These theories on
product prices are applicable to the underwriting market
because this market satisfies the key assumption that
quality is ex ante unobservable.25'
of the security they would want to hold.").
248See id. (stating that rational traders will adjust their demand to the reflect the information
conveyed by the price).
249 See supra Part IV.A.3.a-b.ii.
2 .See supra Part II.E. 1.
25' Fang, supra note 195, at 2731-32.
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The quality of securities, just like the quality of underwriting services, is ex
ante unobservable.252
Second, the logic underlying the informational role of securities prices
in the secondary market also applies to their role in the primary market.
Rational investors know that the offering price is chosen by the issuer and
underwriter after an intrinsic valuation and a bookbuilding or negotiation
process. 253  Rationally, the offering price should reflect the security's
fundamental characteristics and thus should convey information about
fundamental value.254 Although most economists have not extended the
theory of the informational role of prices to primary offerings, there are a
few exceptions. For example, in a recent article, Fabrizio Adriani, Luca
Deidda, and Silvia Sonderegger premised their analysis of the role of
financial intermediaries in securities issues on the assumption that offering
prices signal security quality:
[S]ignaling creates an upward pressure on the offering price
that eventually causes market breakdown. Intuitively, good
issuers tend to raise the offering price to differentiate
themselves, while bad types raise the offering price to
mimic good types. This signaling spiral only stops when
the offering price is too high for trade to occur.2 55
c. The Relationship Between an Increase in Offering Price
and Higher First-Day Returns Is Consistent with Investors'
Interpreting Offering Price as a Signal of Fundamental
Value
Financial research shows that, when a security's offering price is set
above the original file price range, the security's first-day returns are
2 52
See id; supra Part IV.A.3.a-b.ii.
253 See supra Part II.E. 1.
254 See supra Part II.E. 1.
255 Fabrizio Adriani et al., The Role of Financial Intermediaries in Securities Issues: A
Theoretical Analysis 3 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 16112, 2009), available
at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16112/index.html; see also Fabrizio Adriani & Luca G.
Deidda, Competition and the Signaling Role of Prices 33 (Ctr. for N.S. Econ. Research, Working




higher.1 6 Michael Adams, Barry Thornton, and Russ Baker, analyzing data
compiled by finance scholar Jay Ritter, made the following findings:
Table 3 shows that this pattern has held throughout 1980-
2001: When the offer price exceeds the maximum of the
original file price range, the average IPO underpricing is
significantly above average (53% instead of 3% for IPOs
adjusting their offer price downward and 12% for IPOs
priced within their filing range). 7
Consistent with these findings, finance scholars Michelle Lowry and G.
William Schwert found that a 10% higher price update corresponded to a
6.8% higher initial return.
258
One explanation is that both of these circumstances-the higher offering
price and the higher first-day retums-are symptoms of investors' over-
optimism. 259  In support of this explanation, finance scholars Andreas
Oehler, Marco Rummer, and Peter N. Smith argue that "high pre-IPO
prices, which indicate overly optimistic investors, are a good predictor of
high initial returns during the first trading day.' 26° Under this explanation,
there is not a causal connection between a higher offering price and higher
first-day returns.26'
A second explanation is that the increase in offering price affects
256 See GEDDES, supra note 47, at 74 ("Interestingly, in situations where the price range has
been revised upwards and the price has been set at the higher level, IPOs have a higher one-day
premium than those that stay within the range, or price below the range .... "); Daniel J. Bradley
& Bradford D. Jordan, Partial Adjustment to Public Information and IPO Underpricing, 37 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 595, 615 (Dec. 2002) ("Issues in which the offer price is above the
file range are generally much more underpriced."); Ritter & Welch, supra note 85, at 1805
("[W]hen underwriters revise the share price upward from their original estimate in the
preliminary prospectus, underpricing tends to be higher.").
257Adams et al., supra note 129, at 58.
258See Michelle Lowry & G. William Schwert, Is the IPO Pricing Process Efficient?, 71 J.
FIN. ECON. 3, 22 (2004).
2 5 9 
See Adams et al., supra note 129, at 58 ("Specifically, a high-demand IPO, which is due to
investors' over optimism, is more likely to create a speculative bubble. The speculative bubble
may temporarily push the stock price above its intrinsic value, followed by long-run price
correction. As a result, a relatively high positive initial return will be followed by a negative long-
run return.").
260Oehler et al., supra note 132, at 127.
261 See id. ("This approach argues that high and fluctuating initial returns are caused by
demand from different groups of investors and are not induced by a required discount due to
asymmetrically distributed information and ex-ante uncertainty.").
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demand for the stock, causing the higher first-day returns. 262 Consistent
with this explanation is the widely held view that setting an offering price
above the original file range builds up investor demand by creating the
appearance of a "hot" offering.2 63 Indeed, some people suspect that
underwriters may intentionally set a low file range with the plan to increase
demand by later revising the range.26
This second explanation would support the informational role of a
security's offering price. Under this explanation, investors interpret the
higher offering price as an indication that the security's fundamental value
is higher than previously thought, thereby increasing demand for the
265security.
d. Investors'Interpretation of Offering Price as Rationally
Related to Fundamental Value Is a Self-Fufilling
Prophecy
Finally, to the extent that courts were to recognize that an issuer and
underwriter make an implicit representation that a security's offering price
is rationally related to the security's fundamental value, reasonable
investors-to the extent they were not already doing so-would so interpret
the offering price of securities. This author has previously noted a
comparable circular relationship between investors' reliance on puffing
statements and courts' treatment of puffing statements as material:
A key assumption underlying the securities fraud
materiality standard is that stock purchasers expect a
company's representatives to make puffing statements and
thus lend them no credence. In other words, it is assumed
that "reasonable" investors disregard some statements by
corporate officers. Of course, this assumption is self-
perpetuating. Presumably, one of the reasons that
262See Adams et al., supra note 130, at 71 ("The ultimate stock price, relative to the stated
range, is hypothesized to influence the IPO's short term performance.").
263 See GEDDES, supra note 47, at 74 ("Bankers build up demand for the shares then increase
the price range because of 'substantial' investor interest. The pricing momentum helps to create
the appearance of a hot offering.").
264 See Lowry & Schwert, supra note 258, at 11 ("[A]ccording to some people, investment
bankers deliberately set the price range low during the 1990s, with the hope of generating
momentum and thereby increasing demand for the offering.").
265See supra Part tV.A.3.a.
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reasonable investors discount puffing statements is their
understanding that these types of statements cannot support
a securities fraud claim.
The use of a subjective materiality standard to prosecute
corporate officers for wire or mail fraud may encourage
investors to lend credence to vague statements of corporate
optimism, undercutting the assumption that investors
disregard puffery. Recognizing that corporate officers can
face imprisonment for a false statement of corporate
optimism, investors may begin to take every statement-
even a puffing one-at face value.266
Under this same logic, if investors knew that issuers and underwriters
faced potential securities fraud liability for setting an offering price that was
not rationally related to the security's fundamental value, investors would
interpret the offering price as containing an implicit representation to that
effect.
4. Courts May Nonetheless Refuse to Recognize the Implicit
Representation that the Offering Price Is Rationally Related to
Fundamental Value
As explained above, courts have recognized the presence of implicit
representations when there is an information imbalance and a reasonable
understanding of the implicit representation, and both of these elements are
arguably present when an issuer and an underwriter set the offering price of
267a security.  Two additional barriers may prevent courts from recognizing
that issuers and underwriters impliedly represent that the offering price is
rationally related to fundamental value. First, some courts are reluctant to
recognize additional implicit representations, even when there is an
informational imbalance and the representation is reasonably understood.
Second, courts may permit issuers and underwriters to disclaim the implied
representation, and the business environment may not prevent the
widespread use of such disclaimers.
266 Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime's Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing
Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009).
267See supra Part IV.A. 1-3.
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a. Some Courts Are Reluctant to Recognize Additional
Implicit Representations
A number of circuit courts have refused to recognize other alleged
implicit representations for purposes of securities fraud liability---even in
circumstances involving an information imbalance and a reasonable
understanding of the implicit representation. For example, in SEC v.
Tambone, the First Circuit recently rejected the SEC's argument that
underwriters, who have a duty to investigate the nature and circumstances
of an offering, make an implied representation to investors that they have a
reasonable basis for believing that the statements in the prospectus are
true.268 Similarly, in Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, the Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs argument that an accounting firm makes an
implied representation that a firm's 10-Q's are accurate when the public
understands that the firm is at work behind the scenes.269
The statements in both Tambone and Lattanzio are distinguishable from
the implicit representation proposed in this article because each represented
an attempt to blur the distinction between primary and secondary liability.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that primary securities fraud
liability extends only to those parties who actually make the false
misrepresentations on which investors rely.270 In Tambone, the issuer made
the allegedly false statements in the prospectus, and the SEC attempted to
use an implicit representation by the underwriter to make the underwriter
primarily liable for those statements.271 Similarly, in Lattanzio, the issuer
made the allegedly false statements in the 1O-Q's, and the plaintiff
attempted to use an implicit representation by the accounting firm to make
the accounting firm primarily liable for those statements.272 By contrast, the
recognition of the implicit representation underlying the setting of the
268597 F.3d 436, 447-48 (lstCir. 2010) (en banc).
269476 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).
27 0See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008)
("In all events we conclude respondents' deceptive acts, which were not disclosed to the investing
public, are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance. It was Charter, not respondents, that
misled its auditor and filed fraudulent financial statements; nothing respondents did made it
necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did."); Cent. Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994) ("Were we to allow the
aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any
showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and abettor's statements or actions.").
271 Tambone, 597 F.3d at 438-40.
272Lattanzio, 476 F.3d at 154-55.
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offering price is not an attempt to blur the primary-secondary liability
distinction. Therefore, this implicit representation does not invoke the host
of policy reasons for limiting primary liability to primary actors.273
Moreover, other courts have been more willing to recognize implicit
representations when there is an information imbalance and the
representation is reasonably understood.274 For example, in Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., the Seventh Circuit recognized that an underwriter, by
participating in the sale of an issue, makes an implied representation to
investors that it has met the standards of its profession in investigating the
275issuer. In reaching this ruling, the court noted the existence of an
information imbalance between the underwriter and investors: "An
underwriter's relationship with the issuer gives the underwriter access to
facts that are not equally available to members of the public who must rely
on published information., 276 Moreover, the court recognized that investors
reasonably understand underwriters as making this implicit representation:
"And the relationship between the underwriter and its customers implicitly
involves a favorable recommendation of the issued security. 277
Similarly, in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., the
Second Circuit recognized that an underwriter, by participating in a tender
offer, makes an implicit representation that statements in the registration
materials are correct.27 The court noted that an underwriter has unique
access to information about the company, including "ready access to the
books and records," and that investors reasonably understand the
... See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161 ("Were the implied cause of action to be extended to
the practices described here, however, there would be a risk that the federal power would be used
to invite litigation beyond the immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already
governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees."); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 189 ("This
uncertainty and excessive litigation can have ripple effects. For example, newer and smaller
companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals. A professional may fear that
a newer or smaller company may not survive and that business failure would generate securities
litigation against the professional, among others. In addition, the increased costs incurred by
professionals because of the litigation and settlement costs under lob-5 may be passed on to their
client companies, and in turn incurred by the company's investors, the intended beneficiaries of
the statute.").
274See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1070 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 425 U.S. 929, 929-30 (1976).
275 
id
276 1d at 1069-70.
2771d. at 1070.
27
1See 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 1973).
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underwriter as implicitly representing its agreement with the statements in
the registration materials: "Prospective investors look to the underwriter-a
fact well known to all concerned and especially to the underwriter-to pass
on the soundness of the security and the correctness of the registration
statement and prospectus. 279
b. Courts May Permit Issuers and Underwriters to Disclaim
the Implied Representation
Sometimes, implied representations can effectively be disclaimed. 280 As
a consequence, issuers and underwriters might attempt to avoid price-fraud
liability by expressly stating in the offering materials that the offering price
is not rationally related to the security's fundamental value.
Courts have not analyzed the express disclaimer of implied
representations in the securities fraud context. This issue has likely not
arisen because business realities make express disclaimers of most implied
representations unworkable. For example, a CEO is unlikely to accompany
his or her prediction about the company's future performance with an
express statement that the prediction lacks a reasonable basis.
Perhaps business realities would similarly prevent issuers and
underwriters from expressly disclaiming that the offering price bears a
rational relationship with the security's fundamental value. If investors
interpreted this disclaimer as an indication that the issuer and underwriter
viewed the offering price to be irrationally high, issuers and underwriters
would likely prefer to price to fundamentals rather than risk a failed
offering. 281  If, however, investors viewed the disclaimer as a mere
boilerplate warning compelled by the lawyers, this disclaimer could
undercut the bubble-quelling effects of price-fraud liability.
282
In that case, perhaps courts would conclude that the implied
representation underlying the offering price cannot be disclaimed. For
example, in the analogous context of promissory fraud, some authority
exists that a promise carries with it two non-disclaimable implied
representations: (1) that the promisor intends to perform the promise;283 and




1 See 37 AM. JUR.2D Fraud& Deceit § 312 (2001 & Supp. 2010).
281 See supra Parts ILE, W.A.
22See supra Parts IE, W.A.
283 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (1977) ("Since a promise necessarily
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B. The Remaining Elements of Securities Fraud Would Be Satisfied
in Some Circumstances
As articulated above, the main sticking point in asserting a securities
fraud claim against issuers and underwriters who price securities above
their intrinsic value is the identification of a misrepresentation.2 5  If, as
argued above, issuers and underwriters make an implicit representation that
the offering price is rationally related to the security's fundamental value,
then the overpricing of securities would potentially be actionable as
securities fraud if the remaining elements of the claim were satisfied. This
section briefly analyzes the remaining elements of a securities fraud claim,
recognizing the potential for these elements to be contested but ultimately
concluding that they would be satisfied in the most egregious
circumstances. In particular, this section analyzes the elements of
(1) falsity; (2) scienter; (3) materiality; (4) reliance; and (5) loss causation.
1. The Falsity Element Could Be Satisfied in Some
Circumstances
In order for an explicit or implicit representation to be actionable as
securities fraud, it must be false or misleading. 28 6 When a representation is
incapable of being categorized as true or false, it cannot form the basis of a
securities fraud claim. 28 7 For example, as explained by the Sixth Circuit,
"[S]tatements describing a product in terms of 'quality' or 'best' or
benefitting from 'aggressive marketing' are too squishy, too untethered to
carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to perform it follows that a promise made
without such an intention is fraudulent and actionable in deceit .... "); but see Ian Ayres &
Gregory Klass, New Rules for Promissory Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 957, 958 (2006) ("This
mandatory rule should be instead a default. A promisor could then disclaim the representation of
intent to perform.").
284Ayres & Klass, supra note 283, at 958-59 ("Courts should, however, retain one mandatory
rule: While some promises do not represent an intent to perform, every promise represents at least
that the promisor does not intend not to perform-that is, she is not entering the contract planning
breach.").
285 See supra Part IV.A.
286See Silver v. H&R Block, Inc., 105 F.3d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1997) ("To prevail on his
securities fraud claims, Silver must show, among other things, that H & R Block made materially
misleading statements or omissions.").
28




anything measurable .... ,,288 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that
"describing a company as 'recession-resistant' lacks the requisite specificity
to be considered anything but optimistic rhetoric. 289
Fundamental analysis of securities is inherently imprecise. In fact, it
has been characterized as "an art, not a science., 290 Economists Owen A.
Lamont & Richard H. Thaler humorously explained the difficulty of
determining the right price of a security:
One of us used to have a colleague who, when teaching
the basic finance course to impressionable young first-year
master of business administration students, would shout the
name of a well-known game show as a key conclusion of
efficient markets: The Price is Right! He would offer little
empirical support for this claim, but could rest assured that
it was a claim that was hard to disprove.29'
The fundamental value of a security cannot be reduced to a specific
number. Rather, security analysis is used to identify a range of values that
292
are supported by the fundamentals and reasonable assumptions. This
range can be used to identify securities that are overpriced, even if the
specific correct price cannot be identified with certainty. The imprecision
of security analysis is exacerbated in the context of new securities issues,
where the companies lack lengthy earning history and other indicators of
fundamental value.293 As a consequence, minor differences between the
288 1d
289 Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995).
2
- Klarman, supra note 2, at xviii ("[V]aluation is an art, not a science.").
291 Lamont & Thaler, supra note 26, at 264-65.
292Klarman, supra note 2, at xviii ("[V]aluation is an art, not a science. Because the value of
a business depends on numerous variables, it can typically be assessed only within a range.");
Lowenstein, supra note 47, at 48 ("Given the practical limits of people's ability to forecast (an
earnings report, a romance, the weather, or anything), the authors urge that investors think in
terms of a range of values."); see also In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477,
485 (S.D.N.Y 2004) ("Constructing a DCF model requires the analyst to make a number of
judgment calls about a company's financial prospects and the likely future growth and profit
potential of its industry, as well as growth rates for the economy as a whole, including financial
and credit markets.").
293Adams et al., supra note 130, at 71 ("It is very difficult to determine the appropriate price
for an IPO. There is no recordable market price before issuing the stock. Most of the time,
issuing companies do not have much operating history."); Kim & Ritter, supra note 115, at 412
("The DCF approach is based on a firmer theoretical footing than any other approach, but in many
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offering price of a security and the range of values supported by the
fundamentals and reasonable assumptions would not support a finding of
falsity.
If, however, the offering price diverges widely from the range of values
supported by the fundamentals, a factfinder could rationally conclude that
the implicit representation was false. Moreover, factfinders are often asked
to determine the fundamental value of securities in other contexts that are
equally as complicated, such as cases in which plaintiff investors contend
that an analyst's research reports about a company's fundamental value
were without a reasonable basis,294 cases in which minority shareholders
contend that directors made false statements about the fairness of a
proposed merger price,295 cases in which shareholders assert appraisal
rights,296 and cases in which company executives are charged with
misstating the "value" of a company's stock.297
situations it is difficult to estimate future cash flows and an appropriate discount rate."); Ritter &
Welch, supra note 85, at 1816 ("[A]ccounting data are in many cases too unreliable a measure of
valuation to facilitate powerful tests, especially because many firms going public are being valued
on the basis of their growth options, not their historical financials. As a result, the power of tests
to explain pricing relative to some 'true fundamental value' is too low to make much headway in
testing whether IPO pricing or after-market valuation better reflects the IPOs' fundamental
valuations unless the sample is large."); Stout, supra note 28, at 654-55 ("The rational
underwriter pricing an initial public offering must judge the offering on its own merits, and cannot
set the offering price of a speculative new firm based on the price at which IBM is currently
trading. These observations explain why underwriters find it much more difficult to price equity
than debt, and why unseasoned equity is the most notoriously difficult to price of all securities.").
294 See, e.g., In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82 ("[As alleged by the plaintiff
investors], [e]xecutives in the research division criticized the 'excessive optimism' that had led to
ever-higher target prices for some stocks and notes the 'failures of analysis,' particularly in the
assumption underlying financial projections, that allowed the boosterism to continue.").
295See, e.g., Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1094 (1991) ("In this case,
whether $42 was "high," and the proposal "fair" to the minority shareholders, depended on
whether provable facts about the Bank's assets, and about actual and potential levels of operation,
substantiated a value that was above, below, or more or less at the $42 figure, when assessed in
accordance with recognized methods of valuation.").
296 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) ("[Price] fairness
relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.").
29
7See, e.g., Superseding Indictment at 28, United States v. Causey, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S.D.
Tex. Jul. 7, 2004) ("[Skilling] asserted that Enron's stock, which was then trading at over $80 per
share, should be valued at $126 per share, attributing $63 of that alleged stock value to EBS and
EES.... As Skilling also knew, EES too was a struggling business."); Transcript of Closing
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2. The Scienter Element Could Be Met in Some Circumstances
Ordinarily, the scienter element is satisfied if a misrepresentation is
made either intentionally or with recklessness as to truth or falsity.
298
Applied in a straightforward manner to price fraud, an issuer or underwriter
would satisfy the scienter element if it knew that the offering price was not
rationally related to the security's fundamental value or was reckless about
that relationship. 299 This would be satisfied in those scenarios discussed
above in which an issuer and underwriter intentionally take advantage of a
bubble market to issue overpriced securities. 300  As discussed below,
however, it is possible that the applicable mental state would be actual
knowledge of falsity, as opposed to mere recklessness.
First, the scienter element might be subjected to a more nuanced
analysis if the court determines that the issuer's and underwriter's implicit
representation about the rational relationship between the offering price and
fundamental value is properly characterized as an opinion.30' In light of the
inherent uncertainty associated with security analysis, some courts have
characterized statements about fundamental value to be statements of
"opinion" rather than "fact., 30 2 As a consequence, courts may characterize
Argument at 11:16:16-11:16:38, United States v. Skilling, No. Crim. H-04-025 ("Mr. Koenig tells
Mr. Lay and Mr. Skilling and the board his best guess is that the retail business is worth $15 a
share.... Mr. Skilling at an analysts conference tells the investors that he projects that, by the end
of 2001, retail will be worth $23 a share.").
298 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.8[3] (6th
ed. 2009) ("It is clear that the scienter requirement is satisfied by a showing of intentional
misrepresentation made with the intent to deceive .... While the recklessness question remains
unsettled at the Supreme Court level, the vast majority of the circuit and district court decisions
have found that recklessness is sufficient to state a claim under lob-5.").
299See id.; see supra Parts I.E, IV.A.3.a-b.
300See supra Part ILE.
301 See In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
302 See In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("[T]he court rejects plaintiffs' characterization of valuation models as 'fact' rather than 'opinion.'
'Facts' about a company include data like amount of sales in a past quarter or the firm's market
capitalization on a given date... or events like an executive's promotion to CEO or the
acquisition of a competitor. In contrast to these objective statements, financial valuation models
depend so heavily on the discretionary choices of the modeler-including choice of method (e.g.,
discounted cash flow vs. market-based methods), choice of assumptions (such as the proper
discount rate or cost of capital for a particular firm or industry), and choice of 'comparables' that




the implicit representation underlying a price-fraud action as an opinion that
the offering price is rationally related to fundamental value.30 3
In order for an opinion to be false, it must be both objectively and
subjectively false.304 In other words, the opinion must lack a reasonable
basis, and the speaker must not truly hold the opinion stated.30 5 An opinion
is not subjectively false if the speaker is merely reckless about its truth or
falsity.30 6 Rather, an opinion is only subjectively false if the speaker
disbelieves the opinion at the time of stating it-in other words, the speaker
must know that the expressed opinion is false in order for it to be
subjectively false.307 As a consequence, the falsity and scienter elements
converge when an opinion is the basis of a securities fraud claim,308
effectively raising the scienter level to knowledge. If the implicit
representation that the offering price is rationally related to fundamental
value is characterized as an opinion, then the issuer and underwriter will be
liable only if they knew that the price was not rationally related to the
fundamental value of the security.309
Second, the scienter analysis might be subject to the stricter actual
knowledge requirement if the implicit representation that the offering price
is rationally related to the security's fundamental value is characterized as a
prediction and if the price-fraud theory is applied to follow-up offerings by
issuers. As explained above, a calculation of a security's fundamental value
303 See id.
304See In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 489 ("[To survive a motion to dismiss on a
false statement of opinion claim, a plaintiff must allege with particularity provable facts to
demonstrate that the statement of opinion is both objectively and subjectively false. It is not
sufficient for these purposes to allege that an opinion was unreasonable, irrational, excessively
optimistic, not borne out by subsequent events, or any other characterization that relies on
hindsight or falls short of an identifiable gap between the opinion publicly expressed and the
opinion truly held." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 492 ("Even if
one credits the plaintiffs' view that Grubman was excessively optimistic, merely being the most
blotto of all the drunken sailors on shore leave does not amount to securities fraud.").
305See HAZEN, supra note 298, § 12.8[3].
30
61n re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
307See HAZEN, supra note 298, § 12.8[3].
308Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, 78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 28-29 (2006) (noting
a similar convergence between the falsity and scienter elements in the context of promissory
fraud) ("Courts reason that a promisor cannot be mistaken about his or her own intent. Thus, if a
defendant didn't intend to perform [thus rendering his implied representation of the intent to
perform false], the misrepresentation must have been a knowing one, and hence there is no need
for separate proof of scienter.").
3
09See supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
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incorporates predictions about future cash flows and opinions about
reasonable assumptions. 310 Therefore, courts might characterize this
implicit representation as a forward-looking statement.311 Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, a forward-looking statement, to the extent
it is not made in connection with an initial public offering,312 is only
actionable if made with "actual knowledge by that person that the statement
was false or misleading. 313
Although characterizing the implicit representation as an opinion or as a
forward-looking statement would limit the imposition of securities fraud
liability, it would not extinguish it. Issuers and underwriters who
knowingly profit from an overly exuberant market would nonetheless
possess the requisite mental state to invoke liability.
3. The Materiality Element Could Be Met in Some
Circumstances
A misrepresentation is material if a reasonable investor would, in
substantial likelihood, find it important in making an investment decision.
314
Undoubtedly, a reasonable investor would find the issuer's and
underwriter's assessments of a security's fundamental value to be
significant in making an investment decision. 315 Indeed, this is supported
by the extensive research showing that investors interpret corporate
behavior as signals of firm value, including the decision to issue equity and
the choice of underwriter. 316
One interesting nuance to the materiality element is the applicability of
the bespeaks-caution doctrine and the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements. Under the bespeaks-caution doctrine, "soft" information, such
as opinions and predictions, can be rendered immaterial if accompanied by
cautionary statements that are "substantive and tailored to the specific
future projections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus which the
31°See supra Part II.A.2.
31 tSee 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)-(c) (2006); supra Part II.A.2.
31215 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2)(D) (excluding forward-looking statements made "in connertion
with an initial public offering" from the safe harbor).
3131d. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).
314 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
315 See supra Part II.E.
316See supra Parts II.E, IV.A.
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plaintiffs challenge." 317  Similarly, under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, forward-looking statements accompanied by appropriate
cautionary statements are rendered inactionable as a matter of law.318
As explained above, a calculation of a security's fundamental value
incorporates predictions about future cash flows and opinions about
reasonable assumptions. To the extent that these components of the
analysis render the implicit representation sufficiently soft, issuers and
underwriters might be able to protect themselves from liability by including
detailed cautionary language about the fundamental value of the security in
the registration statement.
4. The Element of Reliance Could Be Met in Some
Circumstances
In order to prevail on a securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must show that
he or she relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentation. 319  As
explained by the Supreme Court, "Reliance provides the requisite causal
connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs
injury.', 320  Under the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance,
investors' reliance on materially misleading statements may be presumed-
thus allowing for class certification-when the misrepresentations are
disseminated into "an impersonal, well-developed market for securities. 321
In essence, by purchasing or selling securities at the efficient market price,
investors presumably rely on the publicly disseminated information that is
reflected in that price.322
317See Kaufman v. Trump's Castle Funding (In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj
Mahal Litig.), 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993).
31115 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) ("Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, in any
private action arising under this chapter that is based on an untrue statement of a material fact or
omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading, a person referred to in
subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking statement,
whether written or oral, if and to the extent that the forward-looking statement is identified as a
forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement ... ").
319 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008)
("Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's deceptive acts is an essential element of the
§ 10(b) private cause of action.").
a2°Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
3211d at 247.
322 See id. ("An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in
[Vol. 63:1
PRICE FRAUD
As applied to the price-fraud theory, a purchaser of a security in a
primary offering would have to demonstrate that he or she relied on the
issuer's and underwriter's implicit representation that the offering price was
rationally related to the security's fundamental value. Potentially, in order
to meet this burden, purchasers could rely on a presumptive theory of
reliance similar to the fraud-on-the-market presumption.323 Just as publicly
disseminated misrepresentations are incorporated into the market price
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the implicit
representation that the offering price is rationally related to fundamental
value is incorporated into the offering price under the price-fraud theory.
Arguably, by purchasing securities at the offering price, investors are
relying on the implicit representation accompanying that price.
If the price-fraud theory were applied to investors in the secondary
market, 324 investors could establish individualized reliance by showing that
they knew the offering price and relied on its rational relationship with
fundamental value when making the decision to purchase the security. In
addition, the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance could potentially
be available to investors in the secondary market because the offering price,
as well as the accompanying implied representation about its rational
relationship with fundamental value, is widely disseminated.325 The price-
fraud theory-despite its premise that the market price sometimes diverges
from fundamental value-is not inconsistent with the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance, which is premised on informational efficiency
326
rather than fundamental value efficiency.
reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
presumed for purposes of a Rule lOb-5 action.").
323The fraud-on-the-market theory itself is not available to initial public offerings. See
Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 776 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (1991) (holding that the fraud on the market
theory of reliance cannot apply to initial public offerings because there is not an "open and
developed market").
324 See infra Part IV.B.6.
325 See Stuebler v. Xcelera.com (In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig.), 430 F.3d 503, 510 (1st Cir.
2005).
326 See id. ("[T]he fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance does not depend on the
accuracy of the market price .... Rather, this presumption depends on whether the market price
of the stock reflects all available information, such that an investor can be deemed to have
indirectly relied on the misrepresentation. Whether the stock was 'worth' more or less in some
fundamental value sense, while arguable relevant to the efficiency inquiry, is not essential to it.").
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5. The Element of Loss Causation Could Be Met in Some
Circumstances
Finally, in order to prevail on a securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must
establish loss causation. In essence, "[a] private plaintiff who claims
securities fraud must prove that the defendant's fraud caused an economic
loSS.
' 327
In a quintessential securities fraud case, absent intervening causes,3 2 8 an
investor can establish loss causation by showing that the stock price
decreased after the truth was revealed to the market.329 Similarly, in a
price-fraud case, an investor can show loss causation by demonstrating that
the stock price dropped when the truth hit the market that the offering price
was not rationally related to the security's intrinsic value. The truth could
be revealed in two forms: (1) a market bubble could burst that causes the
prices of all of the overvalued securities within a sector to plummet; or
(2) firm-specific information could be disclosed that reveals the discrepancy
between the offering price and intrinsic value. 330  Either way, this later
correction of the discrepancy between the offering price and fundamental
value would arguably constitute an economic loss caused by the fraud.33'
327Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(4)).
... See Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOwA L.
REV. 811, 841 (2008) (recognizing that "it is necessary to account for the multiple factors other
than the defendant's fraud that may have an effect on stock price.").
329 See id. at 825 (noting that "the loss causation analysis in most cases has focused on both
the identification of an adequate corrective disclosure and expert testimony tying that corrective
disclosure to a drop in stock price."); Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in
Fraud-On-The-Market-Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31,
31 (2008) ("[T]he Court is requiring that the defendant's fraud caused the plaintiffs' economic
loss, and in order to prove this connection, plaintiffs must prove that it was the revelation of the
fraud to the market that in fact caused a decline in the value of the plaintiffs' investment.").
330 See Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs'
Attorneys Review the Supreme Court's Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 15 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court in Dura "seemed to recognize that
fraud-induced inflation could be removed in any number of ways in addition to a corrective
disclosure").
331 See, e.g., DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that the plaintiffs had properly alleged loss causation where research analysts allegedly
misrepresented their true opinions about a stock in order to inflate a bubble and the investors lost
money when the bubble burst) ("[T]he publication of the intentionally false opinions that allegedly
distorted the market price of Corvis stock contained the seeds of loss causation. Unless an
intervening event were to occur first, the author of the false opinion will be appropriately held
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6. Several Issues Remain Unresolved
This article does not resolve three issues: (1) whether the price-fraud
theory applies to unregistered offerings; (2) whether the price-fraud theory
applies to second offerings by the issuer; and (3) whether the price-fraud
theory applies to purchasers in the secondary market. Each of these issues
is discussed briefly below, leaving these questions open for future debate.
First, with respect to unregistered offerings, the normative rationale for
price-fraud liability is less compelling. Privately placed securities are
ordinarily subject to resale restrictions and are not actively traded.332 As a
consequence, they are not as prone to bubble markets, and there is less
incentive for speculators to try to ride a growing bubble. In addition, the
prerequisites for recognition of an implied representation about offering
price are less likely to be present. For one, in private transactions, investors
often have access to in-depth information about issuers, lessening the
information imbalance.333 In addition, because prices are often negotiated
at arm's length between issuers and investors, investors are less likely to
interpret the offering price as impliedly representing fundamental value.334
Similarly, with respect to follow-up offerings by issuers, investors are
less likely to reasonably understand the offering price as impliedly
representing fundamental value.335 Ordinarily, second offerings of publicly
traded securities are sold at market price, without the issuer's or
underwriter's exercising any discretion on pricing.336 As a consequence, it
is less likely that the prerequisites for recognizing the existence of an
implied representation would be satisfied.337
responsible when the market eventually corrects the artificially inflated price by bursting the
bubble.").
332See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502, .505-506 (explaining that securities offered under Rule
505 and 506 exemptions from registration have limitations on resale).
333 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (explaining that the
transactional exemption under 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) is available for offerings to "those who are
shown to be able to fend for themselves").
334 
See 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLET-r, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL,. BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURING & REORGANIZATIONS § 8.5 (2d ed. 1995).
33, See HAZEN, supra note 298, § 3.2 & n.26; supra Part II.E.
336 See HAZEN, supra note 298, § 3.2 ("In the case of additional offerings of securities that are
already publicly traded, the price ordinarily will be determined by the closing price on the day
before the offering.").
337See id. § 3.2 & n.7 (explaining the SEC's criteria for determining reasonable investigation
and reliance); supra Part V.A.
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Finally, a purchaser in the secondary market attempting to apply the
price-fraud theory of liability would be subject to the perhaps
insurmountable burden of showing that an implied representation, made at
the time of the offering, was material and continued to affect the market
price at the time of the purchase in the secondary market.338 As time passed
and circumstances changed, the issuer's and underwriter's snapshot
calculation of fundamental value at an earlier point in time would become
less important to reasonable investors.
339
V. PRICE FRAUD Is SIMILAR TO RECOGNIZED SECURITIES CLAIMS
RELATED TO PRICING
The price-fraud theory explored in this article is novel, but it bears some
relationship to other recognized securities theories related to pricing. A
brief analysis of these other pricing theories puts the price-fraud theory in
context and sheds some light on its application.
A. The Price-Fraud Theory Is Similar to Claims Against Qualified
Independent Underwriters for False Pricing Opinions
Until recently, when the interests of an issuer and an underwriter were
too closely aligned, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD)340 required a qualified independent underwriter (QIU) to provide a
pricing opinion in the prospectus. 341 The pricing opinion certified that:
[T]he price at which an equity issue or the yield at
which a debt issue is to be distributed to the public is
established at a price no higher or yield no lower than that
recommended by a qualified independent underwriter
which shall also participate in the preparation of the
registration statement and the prospectus, offering circular,
338See HAZEN, supra note 298, § 3.2 ("In the case of additional offerings of securities that are
already publicly traded, the price ordinarily will be determined by the closing price on the day
before the offering."); supra Part IV.A.
339See HAZEN, supra note 298, § 3.2 ("Circumstances may require post effective amendments
to registration statements and the prospectus."); supra Parts II.E, [V.A.
34In 2007, the NASD was consolidated into Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA). THEODORE S. LYNN ET AL., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS § 12:17 (2009).34 1 Laby, supra note 107, at 433 ("NASD Conduct Rule 2720 requires a QIU to conduct its
own due diligence and provide a pricing opinion when a conflict exists between an issuer and an
underwriter participating in a distribution.").
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or similar document and which shall exercise the usual
standards of 'due diligence' in respect thereto ....
To the extent that a QIU's pricing opinion in a prospectus were false, it
could form the basis of a securities fraud claim.343  For example, in
Glassman v. Computervision Corp., the co-lead underwriter was affiliated
with Computervision, and the prospectus accordingly stated that "the public
offering price can be no higher than that recommended by a 'qualified
independent underwriter' meeting certain standards."3 " The plaintiffs
alleged that, contrary to this representation, the underwriters failed to
consider relevant facts in setting the price.345 Similarly, in Feiner v. SS & C
Technologies, the plaintiff investors alleged that, contrary to the
prospectus's statement that the QIU's "recommended price was the result of
consideration of all the identified factors," the offering price "was 'solely' a
function of what the market would bear.,
346
The price-fraud theory proposed in this article is remarkably similar to
the QIU requirement. In effect, under the price-fraud theory, every issuer
and underwriter provides an implicit pricing opinion.347 QIU pricing
opinions are intended as an antidote to scenarios in which, because they are
too close, the issuer and underwriter do not have the investing public's best
interests in mind.348 By the same token, the price-fraud theory recognizes
342 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Change by National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Exemption From Pricing Requirement by Qualified
Independent Underwriter Under Schedule E to the NASD By-Laws, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,996, 33,996
(proposed Aug. 17, 1989).
343 See, e.g., Feiner v. SS & C Techs., 11 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Conn. 1998) (denying a
motion to dismiss a claim because if the prospectus's statement that the QIU's "recommended
price was the result of consideration of all the identified factors" was untrue, it would be a
misrepresentation).
34490 F.3d 617, 624 (1st Cir. 1996).
141d. at 629. The court dismissed the claim, holding that the plaintiffs failed to plead facts
from which to infer that "the underwriters did not consider up-to-date information." Id. at 629 &
n.15.
346 11 F. Supp. 2d at 210. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss this claim
because "[ilf true, the statement in the Prospectus concerning consideration of various other
factors would be a misrepresentation." Id.
347 See Laby, supra note 107, at 433 ("An additional possible reform to help ensure that an
underwriter acts in a fiduciary capacity with respect to customers is to require an issuer
conducting a public offering to engage an independent outsider to superintend the offering, with a
skeptical eye to ensuring the interests of investors.").
348See id. ("QIUs are employed when an issuer and an underwriter are affiliated or when an
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that, in a bubble market, the issuer and underwriter do not internalize the
risk of contributing to the growing market bubble. The recognition of the
implicit representation that the offering price is rationally related to the
security's fundamental value is an effort to force issuers and underwriters to
internalize this risk.349
Notably, the SEC recently approved an amended version of NASD
Conduct Rule 2720 that omits the QIU pricing opinion.350 The staff of the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority explained that "they were unaware
of instances where QIJs have made recommendations that were
inconsistent with pricing decisions by the book-running lead manager or
lead placement agent" and that "they believe QIU pricing opinions in at-
the-market offerings are of little to no value."
'3 5
B. The Price-Fraud Theory Is Similar to Prevailing Price Claims
Against Broker-Dealers for Fraudulently High Mark-Ups of
Securities
Investors who purchase securities at excessive mark-ups may assert so-
called prevailing price claims against broker-dealers. 352 The SEC explains
the prevailing price theory as follows:
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
proscribe deceptive pricing practices by broker-dealers.
Charging retail customers excessive mark-ups without
proper disclosure constitutes such a deceptive practice or
scheme. The fact that a broker-dealer is acting in a
principal capacity does not diminish its obligation to deal
fairly with public customers. This duty of fair dealing
includes the implied representation that the price a firm
underwriter is conducting a distribution of its own shares. Under these facts, the relationship
between the issuer and the underwriter is too close; acting together, they may not have the best
interests of the investing public in mind.").
349See supra Part III.A.
350See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1 Thereto,
To Modernize and Simplify NASD Rule 2720, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,255 (June 19, 2009).
3511d. 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,257.
352See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1034 (4th Cir.
1997) ("The SEC has brought administrative actions for fraud under 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5
against securities brokers who have allegedly charged excessive markups to their debt securities
customers without disclosing the markups."); SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 500 (D.N.J.
2008) (explaining duty to disclose excessive markup).
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charges bears a reasonable relationship to the prevailing
market price."'
Prevailing price claims are similar to the price-fraud theory because they
are premised on an implied representation about a price's reasonableness.35
4
Prevailing price claims differ from the price-fraud theory, however, in
one major respect. Under prevailing price claims, the correct price that a
broker-dealer should charge investors is the prevailing market price, not the
fundamental value of the security.355 As a consequence, the prevailing price
theory would not be available to investors who allege that issuers and
underwriters set the offering price at a level that the market could bear but
that was not rationally related to the security's fundamental value.
C. The Price-Fraud Theory Is Similar to Merit Review of Offering
Price
The federal securities acts are premised on disclosure: as long as an
issuer complies truthfully with its disclosure obligations, the issuer may
register and sell its securities. 356  In contrast, many state securities acts
353 Zero-Coupon Securities, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,575, 15,576 (Apr. 21, 1987) (footnotes omitted).
354 Bethel et al., supra note 8, at 32 ("Another interesting source of potential litigation in the
context of CDO purchases are claims that the pricing of the CDO assets or interests therein was
inflated relative to the assets' or interests' 'true' value .... A related legal basis for bringing a
pricing claim is a long line of cases that have held that, absent adequate disclosure, when the price
charged an investor bears no reasonable relation to the 'prevailing price' this operates as a fraud
on purchasers.").
355 See 52 Fed. Reg. at 15,576 ("If a dealers price to a customer includes an excessive mark-
up over the prevailing market price, then, absent proper disclosure, the dealer has violated section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule lob-5 thereunder, and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933 .... " (footnotes omitted)); id. ("As a general matter, the best evidence of the prevailing
market price for a broker-dealer who is not making a market in the security is that dealer's
contemporaneous cost of acquiring a security."); Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1034 ("A mark-up is
excessive when it bears no reasonable relation to the prevailing market price." (quoting Bank of
Lexington & Trust Co. v. Vining-Sparks Sec., Inc., 959 F.2d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1992))).
356 See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respecting Capital
Formation, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 407, 410 (2000) ("The 1933 Act, on the other hand, adopted a
disclosure philosophy and thus subjected issuers to no review of the merits, quality, or price of
their shares offered for sale. Once the issuer provided the disclosures mandated by the 1933 Act,
it was free to sell it securities, no matter how poor the quality or how high the price of those
securities." (footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Campbell, Insidious Remnants]; Rutherford B.
Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 556-
57 (1985) ("Under federal law, the purpose of registration is disclosure.") [hereinafter Campbell,
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apply merit review standards.357 In merit review jurisdictions, a securities
regulator can deny registration if the securities fail to meet the jurisdiction's
merit standards.358
Merit standards vary, but a typical statute imposes a "fair, just, and
equitable" standard.359 One component of the merit evaluation is the
fairness of the offering price.360 Regulators assess the fairness of the
offering price by examining the company's earnings history and the
potential for future earnings, among other factors.361
Open Attack]; Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and
the Case for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 649 (2010) (recognizing that
disclosure is the "underlying philosophy of the federal securities laws").
357 Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46
J.L. & ECON. 229, 231 (2003) (explaining that the first blue-sky law, enacted in Kansas in 1911,
afforded the banking commissioner discretion to reject an offering if it failed a "merit review");
Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., Report on State
Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 790 (1986) (explaining that some
states have merit review, some are disclosure-only, and some are nonregulatory).
358 Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra note
357, at 787 ("There is a general understanding that a merit regulator has the authority to deny
registration to an offering on the ground that it is substantively unfair or presents excessive
investment risk to the investor .. "); Campbell, Insidious Remnants, supra note 356, at 410
("Blue sky laws provided substantive standards to be met by issuers of securities and established a
regulatory vetting process in which state regulators had to approve offerings as consistent with the
substantive statutory standards before the issuer was allowed to sell its securities to the citizens of
the particular state."); Campbell, Open Attack, supra note 356, at 563 ("Merit regulation
generally empowers state securities commissioners to deny registration if the offering does not
meet the substantive standards contained in the particular state's securities act.").
359 Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra note
357, at 805 ("Many of the statutes that confer merit authority provide very broad grounds for the
administrator's decision to deny, revoke, or suspend the effectiveness of a registration statement.
A typical provision would authorize the administrator to take such action if he or she finds that the
offering is not 'fair, just and equitable."'); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(7) (amended 2005),
7C U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 2010) (providing alternative merit standards).
360Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra note
357, at 811-12 (explaining that merit regulation often encompasses a review of the "fairness of
the offering price"); Campbell, Open Attack, supra note 356, at 563 ("Some states apply merit
criteria that focus on the price paid for stock by the new investors and, accordingly, will deny
registration in the event the commissioner determines the price to the public is excessive or
unfair.").
361 Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra note
357, at 811-12 (explaining that merit review of the offer price involves the price-earnings
multiple, the potential for higher future earnings, and comparisons with similar securities that are
publicly traded); Campbell, Open Attack, supra note 356, at 564 ("Some states will consider a
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Some of the rationales for state merit review of offering price also
underlie the price-fraud theory. Both are premised on the notions that
issuers and underwriters have an incentive to overprice offerings if the
market will bear it,362 that markets will sometimes bear irrationally high
prices,363 and that tempering this overpricing could help quell market
bubbles.364 Indeed, just as this article proposes the price-fraud theory as a
means of preventing future financial crises, Professor Daniel J. Morrissey
has proposed imposing federal merit review as a means of preventing future
financial crises.365
The price-fraud theory and merit review of offering price also share
some similar criticisms. For one, both are premised on the debatable notion
that a security has an ascertainable fair price.366 In addition, by lowering
price excessive if it is in excess of some predetermined multiple of the company's recent earnings.
Other states determine the excessiveness by the dilution suffered by the new shareholders at the
time of their investment." (footnote omitted)); Richard B. Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 899, 903 (1982) (explaining that merit review states will deny registration if "the
proposed public offering price is too high in relation to the market price, if a market exists, or in
relation to the issuer's earnings history, or other factors").
362 See Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra
note 357, at 824 (summarizing the rationales for merit regulation of offering price) ("The
underwriter has an incentive to charge as high a price as possible to maximize the value of its
discount or commission and hence may not bargain very hard for a price fair to the public
investor.").
363 See id. (summarizing the rationales for merit regulation of offering price) ("Another
assumption is that public investors are induced to purchase at unfair prices by market forces
beyond their control, such as hot-issue expectations .... Fairness to the investor, therefore,
demands that the regulator adjust the offering price so that the security is more likely to be worth
what the investor pays for it."); id. at 826 (summarizing the rationales for merit regulation of
offering price) ("The merit response to this argument is straightforward: the market does not work
well enough to ensure those results, at least for the kinds of issues subject to merit regulation, so
administrative intervention is necessary."); Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in
the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wts. L. REv. 79, 96 ("In order to bring new issue pricing into line
with economic reality, 19 states have adopted some form of restriction on pricing.").
364 Goodkind, supra note 363, at 96 n. 110 (recognizing that merit regulation of offering price
might be "designed to bring the offering price into line for 'fad' industries or for issuers generally
during highly speculative market periods").
365 Morrissey, supra note 356, at 650 (proposing that "a merit-based system of securities
regulation replace the current disclosure-based laws"); id. at 683 ("Federal officials then could
have prohibited the sale of securities because they were not based on 'sound principles' and their
sale would endanger the public interest.").
366 Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra note
357, at 824 (summarizing the rationales for merit regulation of offering price) ("This approach
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offering prices below what the market will bear, both divert money away
from the issuer to be scooped up by speculators in the secondary market.
367
Several of the criticisms of merit review are not implicated by the price-
fraud theory, however, suggesting that the price-fraud theory might be a
more tenable solution than imposing federal merit review.368  First, merit
review is widely criticized as unduly paternalistic. 369 The primary rationale
for merit review of offering price is to protect the public from paying
unduly high prices for securities-in essence, merit review protects
investors from themselves. 370  The price-fraud theory, in contrast, is
primarily motivated by the goal of forcing issuers and underwriters to bear
the risk of financial collapse, thus preventing the growth of dangerous
market bubbles. 371 The protection of overly exuberant investors is a side
benefit of this proposal but not its primary aim.372
Second, merit review is often criticized for interposing an ill-equipped
middleman between issuers and investors.373 As recognized by Professor
assumes that there is an objective, ascertainable investment value for securities that differs from
the price investors will pay.").
367See Goodkind, supra note 363, at 98 (recognizing that, in a state that regulates offer price,
"a great deal of capital which would otherwise have gone to the issuer will instead go into the
pockets of speculators"); Jeffrey T. Haughey & Kevin M. Veler, Blue Sky Laws and State
Takeover Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 713 (1982) ("This
means that attractive issues, which normally go at a premium are sold at a lower price.
Speculators can purchase shares below premium in the original market and can capture it in the
secondary market. Consequently, the premium is lost to the issuer in the original market.");
Tyler, supra note 361, at 906 ("The opponents of merit regulation go on to argue that such
restrictions actually contribute to the 'hot issue' problem which has occurred from time to time."
(footnote omitted)).
368But see Morrissey, supra note 356, at 650 (proposing that "a merit-based system of
securities regulation replace the current disclosure-based laws").
369See Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra
note 357, at 791 (characterizing some merit statutes as "highly paternalistic"); Campbell,
Insidious Remnants, supra note 356, at 408 (characterizing merit regulation as "paternalistic").
37
0See Goodkind, supra note 363, at 98 ("In support of the offering price rules it is said that
they are needed to protect the public from arbitrary overvaluation of issues for which no adequate
market exists."); Haughey & Veler, supra note 367, at 712-13 ("The justification for this
interference with competitive pricing lies in notions of consumer protection. To protect investors
from arbitrary overvaluation of issues without the existence of an adequate market, such
interference is necessary since the public has little basis on which to gauge the value of the
offering.").
371See supra Part III.A.
372See supra Part III.A.
373 Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., supra note
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Morrissey, a weakness in his argument for federal merit review is the
Securities and Exchange Commission's ineffectiveness in its current role,
much less in the expanded role of merit regulator.374 The price-fraud
theory, unlike merit review, does not interpose an ineffective third party
between the issuer and underwriter, on the one hand, and investors, on the
other hand.375 Rather, issuers and underwriters-who themselves possess
the most accurate information about the issuer's business fundamentals-
are incentivized to ensure that the offering price bears a rational relationship
to the securities' intrinsic value.37 6
Third, merit review is often maligned for preventing issuers from raising
capital by denying them registration.377 As Professor Rutherford B.
Campbell, Jr. succinctly explained: "[M]erit regulation unnecessarily
constrains the freedom of people to do business as they see fit, discourages
entrepreneurial initiative and impedes the flow of capital to its most
efficient use."378 The price-fraud theory, on the other hand, does not bar
issuers from access to capital. Rather, it merely forces them to bear the risk
of overpricing.37
In sum, the price-fraud theory shares some rationales with merit review,
while avoiding some of merit review's most troubling criticisms. The
price-fraud theory could be seen as walking the middle ground between
disclosure and merit review by incorporating into the disclosure framework
the merit review concern with the fairness of the offering price.
357, at 839 ("At their current staff level, the state administrators cannot engage in fundamental
analysis in any meaningful way. Examiners have neither the training nor the time to engage in
fundamental analysis of the great number and variety of offerings that cross their desks.").
374 Morrissey, supra note 356, at 687 (recognizing that a criticism of federal merit regulation
is "the current, sorry history of regulatory failure") ("Why should an agency be entrusted with that
power when the SEC's recent failures to protect investors have been so glaring?").
375 See Goodkind, supra note 363, at 98 ("Review of the reasonableness of the offering price
by the securities administrator interposes the judgment of a neutral party between the issuer and its
investment banker on the one hand and the investing public on the other."); Haughey & Veler,
supra note 367, at 808 ("This regulation imposes the state administrator's review of offering price
between the issuer and the investor.").
3 7 6 
See supra Parts III.A, IV.A.
377 Campbell, Open Attack, supra note 356, at 565.
3 78
1d
379 See supra Part III.A.
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D. The Price-Fraud Theory Bears Some Resemblance to the Fraud-
Created-the-Market Theory of Reliance
Under the Fifth Circuit's controversial 380 fraud-created-the-market
theory of reliance, a plaintiff investor may establish the securities fraud
element of reliance by demonstrating that "the existence of the security in
the marketplace resulted from the successful perpetration of a fraud on the
investment community." 381  In other words, a plaintiff who identifies
misrepresentations in offering materials may establish the element of
reliance by showing that, absent the misrepresentations, the securities
would have been unmarketable. Rather than relying on the
misrepresentations directly, the plaintiff relied on them indirectly by relying
on the securities' marketability.382 The Fifth Circuit explained: "The
securities laws allow an investor to rely on the integrity of the market to the
extent that the securities it offers to him for purchase are entitled to be in
the marketplace., 383 Under this theory, securities are unmarketable only if
"they would not have been offered on the market at any price."
384
The fraud-created-the-market theory is similar to the price-fraud theory
in several respects. First, both theories rest on the premise that the integrity
of the offering process itself signals information to investors about the
securities' fundamental value. Under the fraud-created-the-market theory,
the offering process signals to investors that the securities are not
worthless.385 Under the price-fraud theory, the offering process signals to
investors that the offering price bears a rational relationship to the security's
380See, e.g., Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 752-56 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting
the fraud-created-the-market theory of reliance); Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121,
1130-31 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the fraud-created-the-market theory of reliance and detailing
the split in authority).
""Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc), overruled on other
grounds by Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
382See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
391 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[Alctors who introduced an otherwise unmarketable security into the market
by means of fraud are deemed guilty of manipulation, and a plaintiff can plead that he relied on
the integrity of the market rather than on individual fraudulent disclosures.").
383 Shores, 647 F.2d at 471.
3 41d. at 464 n.2.
385See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[S]ecurities meet the




fundamental value. Second, both theories incorporate elements of merit
regulation into the federal securities laws' disclosure framework.386
The fraud-created-the-market theory and the price-fraud theory differ in
several important ways, however. First, and most fundamentally, the fraud-
created-the-market theory is a means of establishing that an investor relied
on a misstatement or omission, not a means of recognizing the existence of
an implicit representation.387 Second, the fraud-created-the-market theory
is limited to scenarios in which the offered securities are "patently
worthless"; 388 it is not available when a plaintiff contends that the alleged
misstatement or omission merely rendered the offering price too high.389
The price-fraud theory, on the other hand, potentially applies whenever the
offering price exceeds the security's intrinsic value, not merely when the
security lacks an intrinsic value altogether.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the price-fraud theory is potentially viable. The biggest
sticking point-the presence of a misrepresentation on which to premise the
securities fraud claim-is arguably solved because, when setting the
offering price of a security, the issuer and the underwriter make an implicit
representation that the security's price is rationally related to its
fundamental value. If the price-fraud theory were recognized, issuers and
underwriters would internalize the risks associated with issuing overvalued
securities. As a result, fewer overpriced securities would be issued,
disrupting the feedback loop that exacerbates the growth of market bubbles.
The price-fraud theory may help prevent the next bubble-and the next
financial crisis.
386 See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
fraud-created-the-market theory of reliance because "[f]ederal securities law does not include
'merit regulation"').
387See infra notes 380-82 and accompanying text.
3
1
8See Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122.
389 See Shores, 647 F.2d at 470 ("If Bishop [the plaintiff] proves no more than that the bonds
would have been offered at a lower price or a higher rate, rather than that they would never have
been issued or marketed, he cannot recover.").
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